Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
Winter 2016

The Sad, Quiet Death of Missouri v. Holland: How Bond Hobbled
the Treaty Power
Robert D. Sloane
Boston University School of Law

Michael Glennon
Tufts University-Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert D. Sloane & Michael Glennon, The Sad, Quiet Death of Missouri v. Holland: How Bond Hobbled the
Treaty Power , in 41 Yale Journal of International Law 51 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/103

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

THE SAD, QUIET DEATH OF MISSOURI V.
HOLLAND: HOW BOND HOBBLED THE
TREATY POWER
Boston University School of Law
Public Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 16-02
41 Yale Journal of International Law 51 (2015).
Revised February 24, 2016

Michael J. Glennon
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Robert D. Sloane
Boston University School of Law

This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty-scholarship/working-paper-series/

Article
The Sad, Quiet Death of Missouri v. Holland:
How Bond Hobbled the Treaty Power
Michael J. Glennon† & Robert D. Sloane††
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................................52
I.

THE TREATY CLAUSE VERSUS THE TENTH AMENDMENT? ............................................................55

II.

DECIPHERING HOLMES’S CRYPTIC OPINION IN HOLLAND .............................................................58
A.
The Textual Rationale ........................................................................................................59
B.
The Force of Functionalism and Adaptivism in Holland ..................................................60
1.
How Holmes Framed the Constitutional Question—and Why ..............................61
2.
Holland’s Functionalist Rationale ..........................................................................63
3.
The Andrews Analogy ...........................................................................................64
C.
An Anachronism? ..............................................................................................................67

III.

HOW BOND HOBBLED HOLLAND ....................................................................................................68
A.
The Court’s Attempt to Sidestep Holland ..........................................................................69
B.
Why the Court’s Attempt to Sidestep Holland Failed .......................................................71
1.
The Neglect of Holland’s Own Federalism Principles ..........................................71
2.
Holland’s Uniform Standard: Treaties and Implementing Legislation ..................72
3.
The Unavoidable Conflict Between Holland and Bond .........................................74
4.
Bond’s Misguided “Background Principle” ...........................................................75
5.
Carey v. South Dakota: The Constitutional Avoidance Canon in Context ............79

IV.

CRITIQUES OF HOLLAND: THEORY AND PRACTICE.........................................................................81
A.
Before Bond: States’ Rights, Individual Rights, and the Lessons of History,
Experience, and Jurisprudence ..........................................................................................81
B.
The Political and Legal Limits of Holland ........................................................................85
1.
Political Constraints: A Short, Not-So-Horrible Parade ........................................85
2.
Legal Constraints: The Scope of Holland ..............................................................87

V.

HOLLAND AND THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES ...........................................................................92
A.
After Bond: The Treaty Power and Federalism in Contemporary Perspective .................92
B.
What the Future Holds .......................................................................................................93
C.
The Postwar Evolution of Treaty Law ...............................................................................94
D.
Medellín’s New Incoherence .............................................................................................96
E.
U.S. Treaty Practice After Bond ......................................................................................100

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................100

†
Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.
††
Professor of Law and R. Gordon Butler Scholar in International Law, Boston University School
of Law. We acknowledge with gratitude the insightful critiques and suggestions of Anthony C.
Colangelo, Michael C. Dorf, Gary Lawson, and W. Michael Reisman; and the research assistance of
Julie Krosnicki, Angela Linhardt, Gabriela Morales, Ashley Novak, Seth Pate, and Emma Wright.
Professor Sloane would also like to express his gratitude to Gary Born and WilmerHale’s Scholar-inResidence Program for generously providing the time and resources to carry out some of the initial work
on this Article.

52

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 41: 51

The treaties of the United States, under the [Articles of Confederation]
are liable to infractions of thirteen [states] . . . . The faith, the reputation, the
peace of the whole union, are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices,
the passions, and the interests of every member of which it is composed. Is it
possible that foreign nations can either respect or confide in such a
government? Is it possible that the people of America will longer consent to
trust their honor, their happiness, their safety, on so precarious a foundation?
—Alexander Hamilton1
INTRODUCTION
Missouri v. Holland2 was to the federal treaty power what McCulloch v.
Maryland3 is to its legislative power. In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall
wrote that “we must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding.”4
In Holland, Justice Holmes interpreted the treaty power in the spirit of
Marshall’s dictum by adopting a functional, adaptivist approach to its
relationship to the Tenth Amendment. Referring to the degree to which the
federal government may make treaties that trench upon what might ordinarily
be traditional state functions, he wrote, “We must consider what this country
has become in deciding what that Amendment has reserved.”5 Holland was
therefore far more than what generations of law students might recall as the
curious case about migratory birds written by the Supreme Court’s most
eminent Justice since Marshall; it was a case, like McCulloch, that would have
vindicated their professors in claiming that we live today, not only in
Marshall’s America but in Holmes’s too. The Constitution’s remarkable
durability and resilience over 230 years should be ascribed in no small part to
the prescient spirit of pragmatism that infuses cases like McCulloch and
Holland.
Yet Holland, alas, should now be discussed in the past tense. On June 2,
2014, in Bond v. United States,6 the Supreme Court abandoned Holland. It did
not say so. Nor did the Justices themselves believe Bond did so. Chief Justice
Roberts, for the majority, and Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas, who
concurred in the judgment only, arguing that Holland should be unambiguously
overruled, all nonetheless wrote as though Bond did not disturb Holland.
Commentators, too, did not see Holland’s demise. 7 A consensus rapidly
emerged that the Court had decided Bond on a narrow statutory basis,
successfully—even if, to the concurring Justices, objectionably—eliding the
1.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 144 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
2.
252 U.S. 416 (1920).
3.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
4.
Id. at 407.
5.
Holland, 252 U.S. at 434.
6.
134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
7.
E.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Federalism, Treaty Implementation, and Political Process: Bond
v. United States, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 486, 486, 495 (2014); Jean Galbraith, Congress’s TreatyImplementing Power in Historical Practice, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 59, 73 (2014); Heather K. Gerken,
Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85, 89 (2014); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Bond
v. United States: Concurring in the Judgment, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 285, 306 (2014). For examples
of earlier media commentary to the same effect, see infra note 98.
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constitutional issue in Holland. But that consensus was premature; and it is
mistaken. The Court tried, of course, to avoid the constitutional issues raised by
Holland. But it failed. In fact, holding all else constant, had Bond honored
Holland, the Court would have reached the opposite result; had Holland
applied Bond’s analysis—a federalism background principle and commensurate
canon of avoidance that will henceforth govern laws implementing treaties—
Holland, too, would have reached the opposite result.8
We write to explain, and lament, Holland’s passing. We argue that it
represented the most sensible reconciliation of the tension between the Treaty
Clause and the Tenth Amendment. We further suggest that Bond is inconsistent
with the Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas,9 for the Court there suggested
that the federal government can do what Bond has now held that it
constitutionally cannot. Yet the problem Bond creates is not limited to one
inconsistency; it runs deeper. By abandoning Holland, the Court has
handicapped the nation in a globalizing world and risked impeding the ability
and reliability of the United States as a treaty partner. Without Holland, it will
be well-nigh impossible for the nation to honor certain treaties—treaties that
the nation has routinely concluded since its founding and, today more than
ever, we expect, increasingly will. Mindful of the origins of the Treaty Clause
in the experience with state practice under the Articles of Confederation, it is
not only unfortunate but also hazardous for the Court to have unwittingly
recreated one of the paramount problems the Framers sought to remedy at
Philadelphia.
Granted, the Court surely will not soon explicitly regard Bond as having
overruled Holland. But for the reasons we develop, adherence to Bond’s
analysis would effectively undermine Holland—notwithstanding the majority’s
effort in Bond to avoid constitutional questions. Indeed, ironically, it is the
Court’s misguided insistence on a background principle and constitutional
avoidance canon based on pre-Holland federalism that renders Bond
inconsistent with Holland. At most, Holland survives in name only. Unless the
Court repudiates Bond’s analysis, it will have abandoned Holland’s core
doctrine. We conclude, however, by noting that the Court could choose to
reorient and expand its remarks in Bond so as to reinvigorate the Holland
doctrine—without conceding error in the case (and thus perhaps saving
institutional face). Such a reorientation would likely have the additional virtue
of clarifying Holland’s holding in conformity with the actual principles that
animated Holmes’s opinion.
We develop the argument in five parts. In Part I, we clarify the
conundrum created by the treaty power’s interaction with the Tenth
Amendment.
In Part II, we argue that a close reading of Holland reveals that its true
rationale is far more subtle and forceful than the textual-delegation rationale
often ascribed to Justice Holmes. We also consider how two oft-neglected
8.
We assume that no alternative rationale or tacit consideration existed in either case;
holding the facts, law, and judicial analyses constant, both decisions would have reached the opposite
result at the times Holland and Bond, respectively, were decided.
9.
552 U.S. 491 (2008).
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decisions on which Holmes relied, Andrews v. Andrews10 and Carey v. South
Dakota,11 offer critical insight into what Holland held—and why.
In Part III, we scrutinize Bond and argue that, contrary to the consensus
that it left Holland untouched, Bond gutted Holland by rejecting at least two
indispensable predicates of Holmes’s analysis: first, that a treaty and its
implementing legislation must be considered together; and, second, that a
treaty’s validity under the Tenth Amendment immunizes that treaty’s
implementing legislation against a generic federalism challenge. In contrast,
Bond held that a treaty and its implementing legislation must be assessed
separately under the Tenth Amendment—without considering the
implementing statute in view of the treaty it implements; and that in doing so,
the “statute—unlike the [treaty]—must be read consistent with principles of
federalism inherent in our constitutional structure.” 12 Further, the Court erred
by treating those “principles of federalism” as excluding, rather than
incorporating, Holland’s interpretation of the interaction of the Tenth
Amendment and the Article II treaty power.
A careful analysis of what Justice Holmes held in Holland makes clear
that Bond and Holland cannot be reconciled. We do not find it plausible to
dismiss the Court’s troubling premise (“the statute—unlike the [treaty]—must
be read consistent with principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional
structure”) as a mere case of careless or ill-considered language. The quoted
premise does not exist in isolation. It both motivated and enabled the majority’s
approach to statutory interpretation and, in particular, Chief Justice Roberts’s
reliance on the canon of constitutional avoidance based on supposed
background federalism concerns. Had the majority honored Holland, no such
concerns would have arisen.
The Court could have plausibly decided Bond on the basis of nonconstitutional principles of statutory interpretation—resolving what it saw as an
ambiguity in the implementing legislation without resort to a federalism-based
canon of constitutional avoidance. But tellingly, it did not. To the contrary, the
proposition that a treaty’s implementing legislation, unlike the treaty itself,
“must be read consistent with principles of federalism inherent in our
constitutional structure,” 13 constituted an indispensable predicate of the
majority’s statutory analysis—the chief factor that resolved the putative
ambiguity of the implementing legislation. The same predicate is emblematic
of the Bond Court’s central mistake. Assuming, as every Justice correctly did,
the constitutionality of the treaty,14 “there can be no dispute about the validity
of the statute”15 based only on general “principles of federalism inherent in our
constitutional structure.”16

10. 188 U.S. 14 (1903), abrogated by Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
11. 250 U.S. 118 (1919).
12. 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (2014) (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 2088.
14. See id. at 2098 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the Court’s consensus that
the treaty is valid).
15. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
16. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088.
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In Part IV, we argue that perennial critiques of Holland and the risks it
allegedly entails ring hollow. No theoretical consideration or practical
development since Holland has suggested any reason to disturb its doctrine.
Indeed, critics have been unable to point to a single incident of abuse or
concrete, not hypothetical, example of any risk that the decision supposedly
poses, including the parade of horribles Holland allegedly set to march. Nor
does Holland threaten to abrogate individual rights or other constitutional
limits. It does not, as the Court wrote in 1957, “confer power on the Congress,
or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution,”17 in particular, those rights set forth in the Bill of Rights and
other provisions of the Constitution.
In Part V, we consider Bond’s likely future consequences, especially its
potentially deleterious implications for modern U.S. treaty practice. We suggest
that the Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas18 implicitly required Holland’s
doctrine. Bond’s abandonment of Holland therefore renders a core holding in
Medellín, which is likely the most significant decision on the domestic U.S. law
of treaties in decades, incoherent. More generally, Bond needlessly complicates
the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs. It diminishes the nation’s diplomatic
capacity, handicapping it in its relations with foreign nations and threatening its
ability to cooperate with them to tackle some of the most serious global issues
in the twenty-first century.
We conclude that the nation’s response to its experience under the
Articles of Confederation, which motivated the Framers to lodge the treaty
power in the federal government and to make treaties supreme federal law,
remains equally vital today. Bond’s short-term effects may seem modest. But
the nation may well come to regret abandoning Holland. For that reason, we
conclude by suggesting how the Court might resolve the problems Bond
created. Without calling into question the result in Bond, the Court could recast
its copious references to federalism to bring its jurisprudence back into
conformity with Holland—because the very “principles of federalism inherent
in our constitutional structure,”19 on which the Court placed such emphasis,
include Holmes’s reconciliation of the treaty power and federalism.
I.

THE TREATY CLAUSE VERSUS THE TENTH AMENDMENT?

The treaty power and the Tenth Amendment, read together, present a
conundrum. The Tenth Amendment provides simply, “The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”20 Article II
gives the President “power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”21 The
conundrum lies in the consequences of applying, or not applying, Tenth

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
552 U.S. 491 (2008).
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2081.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Amendment limits to the treaty power in the event that the federal government
were to ratify an Article II treaty22 regulating a subject generally reserved to
the states—that is, an area of law that falls within the traditional power of the
states to legislate on matters not delegated by the Constitution to the federal
government.23
If the Tenth Amendment limits the treaty power, a treaty obliging the
United States to legislate on a subject reserved to the states would by definition
be unconstitutional. The federal government would be powerless to enter into
the potentially broad class of treaties obliging the United States to enact
domestic federal laws regulating areas of traditional state competence. In
practice, foreign nations would also lack an alternative way to conclude such
treaties with the United States. They would be compelled to negotiate with each
state individually in an effort to conclude fifty identical international
agreements, which, under the Constitution, would be “compacts.”24
The Compact Clause requires that agreements between states and foreign
nations receive congressional approval.25 That a foreign nation might negotiate
fifty substantially identical compacts with the states, each contingent on
congressional approval, is implausible, not to mention inefficient. And even if a
series of state compacts could be concluded, the United States, as a nation,
would not be legally bound by them under federal law; it would not be a party.
The nation would be all but powerless to enforce an international obligation in
the event of a state’s breach.
Because any federal law intended to implement international legal
obligations under these compacts would be unconstitutional, it would also be
left to the states to agree on how to implement those obligations uniformly
under their respective laws and constitutions. This scenario, including the level
of cooperation it would require, is—to say the least—improbable.26 Yet as a
rule, international law recognizes and governs relations between nations, not
their political subdivisions. So the United States, not the states, might incur
international legal responsibility for any breach.27 That prospect, of course,
ranked among the foremost defects of the Articles of Confederation. It is
22. Holland relied on the proposition that Article II treaties differ from other types of U.S.
international agreements. References to treaties, unless otherwise indicated, are therefore only to
international agreements made in conformity with Article II.
23. International law refers to countries as nation-states or simply states. Because we discuss
both nation-states and U.S. states, for clarity and convenience, we refer to nation-states as “countries” or
“nations” and to the states of the Union as “states.”
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. International law is indifferent to the denomination of an
international agreement (compact, treaty, convention, etc.). Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Under the Constitution, however, even though neither
the Court nor anyone else has managed to explain what differentiates treaties from compacts,
terminology matters. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE US CONSTITUTION 152 & nn.1213 (2d ed. 1996) (citing, inter alia, Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the
Constitution—A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 695 n.37 (1925)).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
26. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (concluding that Congress may not
constitutionally commandeer the states to enter into compacts by which they would cooperate to dispose
of radioactive waste produced within their respective jurisdictions).
27. Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 4, in Report
of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, at 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
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difficult to imagine that the Framers understood the Tenth Amendment and the
treaty power, in conjunction, to create one of the very problems they sought to
resolve at Philadelphia. At any rate, today, with more and more problems
requiring global cooperation and with the proliferation of multilateral treaties,
the detrimental consequences of this reading of the Constitution could be
serious and far-reaching. The United States could find itself increasingly
isolated in foreign affairs and handicapped in its relations with other nations.
Yet the alternative resolution to the conundrum is also problematic. If the
Tenth Amendment does not limit the treaty power, the rights reserved to the
states would be theoretically defeasible at the whim of the federal government.
With the right treaty partner, it would seem that the federal government could
enter into a treaty on a subject ordinarily reserved to the states and then enact
legislation to implement its treaty obligations under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.28 The treaty and its implementing legislation, in turn, would preempt
inconsistent state law under the Supremacy Clause. The principal obstacle to
federal government intent upon usurping state authority over a local issue
would be finding another nation able and willing to enter into a treaty including
the necessary obligations. Echoing other critics, Justice Scalia thus suggested in
Bond that “the holding that a statute prohibiting the carrying of firearms near
schools went beyond Congress’s enumerated powers . . . could be reversed by
negotiating a treaty with Latvia providing that neither sovereign would permit
the carrying of guns near schools.”29 If the treaty power enables the federal
government to coopt powers reserved to the states in this way, the Tenth
Amendment would become no more than a “parchment barrier” in Madison’s
felicitous phrase. 30 State authority over traditional state functions could
atrophy as globalization, and the consequent need for international cooperation
on issues once deemed quintessentially local, relentlessly broaden and advance.
For most of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, the United
States remained a largely agrarian, inward-looking country and a comparatively
minor player on the international stage. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine,31 while
principally intended to convey to the major European powers that the United

28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Indeed, depending on its details, the implementing
legislation could preempt state regulation of an entire field of law ordinarily reserved to the states.
29. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2100 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). Since Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), commentators have expressed concerns
about this risk. We are aware of no evidence that it has ever materialized. Comparable hypotheticals
have, however, become a staple of courses in foreign relations law. Holland is often deemed a “liberal”
decision because of such hypotheticals. Yet the issue does not, in fact, track any partisan divide.
Consider, by contrast to Justice Scalia’s example, what might be characterized as a “conservative”
hypothetical: the Supreme Court overrules Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), holding that abortion’s
regulation falls within the realm of rights reserved to the states. Thereafter, some states prohibit abortion
while others legalize and regulate it. The President and Senate, dissatisfied with the unwieldy patchwork
of state laws and believing abortion should be nationally prohibited, ratify the American Convention on
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. Article 4 of the Convention says that everyone has
the right to life, which “shall be protected by law, in general, from the moment of conception.” Id. art. 4.
Congress might then enact implementing legislation to uniformly prohibit abortion in all or virtually all
circumstances, preempting state laws that authorize it. Countless similar hypotheticals, culminating in
conventionally liberal or conservative outcomes, may be constructed. Holland’s political valence is de
minimis.
30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 333 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
31. 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 22-23 (1823) (statement of Pres. James Monroe).
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States would not tolerate their intrusion in the Western hemisphere, also
reflected a policy against being drawn into the maelstrom of European
diplomatic maneuvering, colonial politics, and wars—a prudent stance for a
fledgling nation that persisted, with some exceptions, into the twentieth
century.32 Also, for much of the nineteenth century, custom remained the
principal source of international law. Treaties, particularly multilateral treaties,
were less common.33 And because treaties seldom implicated local issues, the
conundrum raised by the potential tension between the treaty power and the
Tenth Amendment remained largely academic.
Nations began to conclude more treaties after the 1814 Congress of
Vienna, however, and by the turn of the century, the number of treaties had
proliferated. Even then, bilateral treaties remained the norm and multilateral
treaties focused almost exclusively on bread-and-butter international issues.
Nations rarely perceived the need for international regulation of local issues.
Research discloses few jurists at the time who considered whether treaties
could regulate matters that traditionally fell within the province of state law.34
Nor had the Supreme Court yet considered the issue directly.35 But it would
have been at least reasonable to suppose that the federal government could not
sidestep the Tenth Amendment with a minuet patterned by the Treaty Clause.
II. DECIPHERING HOLMES’S CRYPTIC OPINION IN HOLLAND
That changed in 1920. The issue confronted the Court squarely in
Missouri v. Holland.36 In 1913, Congress had enacted one of the nation’s first
environmental laws, regulating the taking of game and migratory birds.37 Yet
less than two decades earlier, in Geer v. Connecticut, the Court had said that
“the right to preserve game flows from the undoubted existence in the State of a
police power,”38 notwithstanding incidental effects on interstate commerce.
Relying in part on Geer, two federal district courts held that the 1913 statute
usurped powers reserved to the states.39
32. JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE COLD WAR: A NEW HISTORY 206 (2005).
33. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV.
390, 396 (1998).
34. But see HENKIN, supra note 24, at 189-90, 456 n.57. Some scholars sought to establish
“that the executive and legislative branches of the government in the period 1830-60 believed that
treaties could not deal with matters not otherwise in the federal domain.” Id. at 456 n.57 (citing, inter
alia, Ralston Hayden, The States’ Rights Doctrine and the Treaty-Making Power, 22 AM. HIST. REV.
566 (1917)). According to Henkin, however, these scholars “represented a minority view.” HENKIN,
supra note 24, at 462 n.57.
35. In Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2098 & n.4 (2014), Justice Scalia noted that
Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 121 (1901), and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 619
(1842), respectively, “embraced” and “arguably favor[ed]” the rationale in Holland—albeit, in his view,
“without reasoning.” In contrast, in Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662
(1836), the Court said that treaties may not expand the scope of the powers delegated by the Constitution
to the federal government. Henkin suggests that “the basic principles of . . . Holland were laid down in
the early years of the Republic.” HENKIN, supra note 24, at 463 n.65 (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 199 (1796)).
36. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
37. Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 828, 847 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 673
(2012)).
38. 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896).
39. United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915); United States v. Shauver, 214 F.
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Undeterred, the United States entered into a treaty with the United
Kingdom, which, at the time, controlled Canadian territory. Migratory birds of
value to both nations routinely traversed the border. The treaty thus required
each nation to enact laws protecting migratory birds within their territories.
Congress then enacted legislation substantially identical to the 1913 statute that
two federal district courts had struck down40—but this time in the exercise of
its Necessary and Proper Clause power to implement the treaty. Missouri
brought suit claiming a Tenth Amendment violation. The Court therefore faced
the core issue directly: may Congress legislate under the Necessary and Proper
Clause to implement an Article II treaty if the implementing legislation might
otherwise exceed Congress’s enumerated powers,41 intruding upon an area of
law ordinarily reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment?
Justice Holmes answered in the affirmative with characteristic eloquence
and brevity. Whether he truly intended to offer arguments in the alternative,
Holland has been read to supply at least two rationales for the Court’s decision:
one textual, the other functionalist or adaptivist. Much of the literature focuses
on or presupposes the former (textual) rationale. Yet as we will see, it is
implausible. We nonetheless explain and critique it briefly at the outset—in
part because of its prominence in the literature but, more significantly, to
situate it within the context of Holland’s actual, and far more compelling,
rationale.
A. The Textual Rationale
The textual rationale seizes upon Holmes’s self-evident observation that
Article II of the Constitution delegates the whole treaty power to the federal
government.42 At first blush, Holmes thus seems to have supposed simply that
any treaty, and any law made to implement a treaty, is by definition not
reserved to the states. But that apparent argument rests on a semantic error. The
Treaty Clause, which says that the President has “Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,” is not a delegated power
comparable to Congress’s Article I, Section 8 delegated (enumerated) powers;
rather, it is a mode of exercising power. It enables the federal government to
make treaties to regulate international issues, including but not limited to trade,
extradition, military alliances, borders, fishing and navigation rights, and
154 (E.D. Ark. 1914). These decisions have been thought to show that, before Holland, no one thought
treaties could empower the federal government to act in realms otherwise reserved to the states. Not so.
Before Holland, at least three district courts had sustained the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
notwithstanding that substantially the same law might be constitutionally beyond federal power absent
the treaty. See United States v. Thompson, 258 F. 257 (E.D. Ark. 1919); United States v. Rockefeller,
260 F. 346, 348 (D. Mont. 1919); United States v. Samples, 258 F. 479 (W.D. Miss. 1919); see also
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2098 & n.4 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing two earlier
Supreme Court opinions favorable to Holland).
40. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920).
41. Many have framed the issue posed by Holland solely in terms of Congress’s Article I,
Section 8 delegated powers. That is misleading, for it is not the question Holmes answered. The
Constitution does not limit the federal government’s delegated powers to those of Congress. Nor is there
a “plausible reason to suppose that the treaty power can extend only to subjects within Congress’s
enumerated powers.” Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 11.
42. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 432.
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diplomatic relations. Unlike Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers, the text of
Article II, Section 2 neither specifies nor limits the subjects about which
treaties may be concluded.
Congress’s legislative power, insofar as that refers to its power to make
laws, is likewise properly understood as a mode of exercising the powers
“herein granted,”43 by Article I, Section 8 over enumerated subjects: regulating
commerce, coining money, establishing post offices, making rules to govern
the army, and so forth.44 The Constitution does not say that Congress has the
“power to make laws”; rather, it vests “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted”
in “a Congress of the United States.”45 Hence, the word “Power[]” in Article I,
Section 1 is not semantically equivalent to “Power” in Article II, Section 2,
Clause 2. When we speak of Congress’s delegated powers, we typically mean
the Article I, Section 8 “list” of enumerated powers, not Congress’s authority to
make laws about the items on that list. In short, the word “delegated” can be
ambiguous and therefore misunderstood in this context. Were we to
conceptualize the treaty and legislative modes as freestanding powers that the
Constitution delegates to the federal government, then the Tenth Amendment,
which reserves to the states those powers not delegated to the federal
government, would limit the operation of neither. That construction would
effectively read the Tenth Amendment out of the Constitution. It would have
nothing on which to operate.
To avoid this absurd result, neither the legislative nor the treaty mode
should be understood as a delegated power within the meaning of the Tenth
Amendment. The textual rationale alone would not only sweep too broadly; it
is simply implausible. The other, and far better, rationale, as Holmes surely
recognized, would likely be characterized in modern constitutional theory as
functionalist or adaptivist. Our analysis of Holland will focus on this dimension
of its rationale—for despite, or perhaps because of, the perennial debate about
Holmes’s “cryptic” opinion,46 it has not, we suggest, been correctly or fully
understood in the literature.
B. The Force of Functionalism and Adaptivism in Holland
Holmes made short work of the facts in Holland, recounting them briefly
only to remark that “it is enough that the bill is a reasonable and proper means
to assert the alleged quasi sovereign rights of a State,” for “the question raised
is the general one whether the treaty and statute are void as an interference with
the rights reserved to the States.”47 But after so posing the question, Holmes
appropriately reframed it. The issue, he said, cannot be resolved simply by

43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
44. The Constitution does not, of course, delegate the power to make treaties to the states; it
expressly prohibits them from exercising this mode of exercising power. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. But
delegating the treaty mode to the federal government—without enumerating (as Article I, Section 8 does
for Congress) or otherwise indicating the scope of the substantive legal issues delegated—does not tell
us which, if any, such substantive issues the Tenth Amendment might nonetheless reserve to the states.
45. Id. art. I, § 1.
46. E.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 7, at 295.
47. 252 U.S. at 431-32.
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reference to the Tenth Amendment. That Amendment reserves to the states
only what the Constitution does not delegate to the federal government—and
yet Article II delegates the treaty power to the federal government. Holmes did
not, however, rest his argument on this observation alone, which, as noted,
would be misguided.
1. How Holmes Framed the Constitutional Question—and Why
It is nonetheless worth pausing here to emphasize how and why Holmes
reframed the constitutional question as he did. Missouri had argued that the
federal statute interfered with its Tenth Amendment right to regulate migratory
birds within its territory—not to make treaties.48 That is, of course, exactly as
one would have expected. After all, the Court had previously characterized this
right as an aspect of “the undoubted existence in the state of a police power.”49
And just one year before Holland, in Carey v. South Dakota, the Court had
applied the interpretive canon of constitutional avoidance50 to avoid deciding
the constitutionality under the Tenth Amendment of the pre-treaty 1913
Migratory Bird Act relative to a state law that regulated the shipping of
migratory birds. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court, construed the 1913
Act narrowly, sidestepping the federalism issue and reiterating essentially what
the Court had said in Geer: “a state has exclusive power to control wild game
within its borders, and the South Dakota law was valid when enacted, although
it incidentally affected interstate commerce.”51 The Missouri law at issue in
Holland also did not affect interstate commerce more than incidentally, for the
Court construed the Commerce Clause more narrowly at the time. Missouri
therefore had every reason to conclude that the Tenth Amendment reserved to it
the right to regulate migratory birds, free from federal interference.
But Justice Holmes correctly reoriented the analysis to focus on the
true—and constitutionally distinct—question. Rather than asking whether the
Tenth Amendment reserves to the states power over the subject of the
legislation (migratory birds), the question raised in Geer and Carey, he
observed that the Amendment does not, of course, reserve to the states the
power to make treaties. To the contrary, the Constitution expressly delegates
that power to the federal government and denies it to the states.52 That was and
is uncontroversial. It is not the gravamen of Holmes’s rationale, as noted in the
preceding Section. Yet it enabled him to clarify an indispensable point: that the
“question before us is narrowed to an inquiry into the ground upon which the
present supposed exception is placed.”53
Holmes clarified, in other words, that the appropriate way to frame the
constitutional question in Holland, in contrast to Carey and Geer, is not to ask
48. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920).
49. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896).
50. Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118, 122 (1919) (“Where a statute is reasonably
susceptible of two interpretations, by one of which it would be clearly constitutional and by the other of
which its constitutionality would be doubtful, the former construction should be adopted.”).
51. Id. at 120.
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; id. art. II, § 2.
53. 252 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added).
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whether the treaty power calls for an exception to the Tenth Amendment but
the converse: whether the Tenth Amendment compels an exception to the
federal government’s otherwise plenary power to make treaties. Recall in this
regard that the federal government’s power to make treaties, unlike Congress’s
power to make laws, is not textually limited to enumerated subjects. That is
why, as Holmes thereafter emphasized, “[w]hether the two cases [striking down
on Tenth Amendment grounds the earlier federal law regulating migratory
birds] were decided rightly or not[,] they cannot be accepted as a test of the
treaty power.”54 As he remarked in a critical but often misunderstood sentence,
“[i]f the treaty is valid there can be no dispute [under the Tenth Amendment]
about the validity of the statute under Article 1, Section 8, as a necessary and
proper means to execute the powers of the Government.”55 Holland therefore
focused on the Tenth Amendment validity of the treaty—and only derivatively
on its implementing legislation.
Holland, Holmes continued, raised an issue quite distinct from those in
Geer, Carey, and the two federal district court decisions that had struck down
the earlier 1913 Migratory Bird Act—namely, whether the Tenth Amendment
compels an exception to the otherwise (textually) plenary federal power to
make treaties. The Court held that it does not. Holmes’s rationale for this
conclusion is worth quoting here at length:
It is said that a treaty cannot be valid if it infringes the Constitution, that there are
limits, therefore, to the treaty-making power, and that one such limit is that what an
act of Congress could not do unaided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the
States, a treaty cannot do. . . .
[But] that cannot be accepted as a test of the treaty power [under the Tenth
Amendment]. We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treatymaking power; but they must be ascertained in a different way. It is obvious that
there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act
of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could, and
it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, ‘‘a power
which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government’’ is not
to be found. . . . What was said in that case with regard to the powers of the States
applies with equal force to the powers of the nation in cases where the States
individually are incompetent to act. . . . [W]hen we are dealing with words that also
are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that
they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to
realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has
cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The
case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not
54. Id. at 433 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 432. This sentence has caused needless confusion and often been criticized, most
recently by Justice Scalia’s characterization of it as “unreasoned and citation-less.” Bond v. United
States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2098 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); cf. Bradley, supra note 33,
at 424 (speculating about this sentence’s interpretation). In context, it is clear that Holmes meant only to
refer to the Tenth Amendment validity of the legislation, that is, valid in the sense of necessary and
proper despite otherwise potentially applicable federalism limits. Legislation to implement a treaty may,
of course, be invalid for many reasons that have nothing to do with the Tenth Amendment. It might, for
example, bear an insufficiently rational relationship to the treaty under the Necessary and Proper Clause
or abrogate express individual rights. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1 (1957). Holmes did not—because nothing in Holland required him to—speculate about such other
arguable “qualifications to the treaty-making power.” 252 U.S. at 432.
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merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago. The treaty in question does not
contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The only question
is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the
Tenth Amendment. We must consider what this country has become in deciding
56
what that Amendment has reserved.

2. Holland’s Functionalist Rationale
This quotation has become famous, not only for its significance to
Holland’s rationale but also because it captures a particular, albeit
controversial, view of political theory, judicial interpretation, and the relevance
of history to constitutional adjudication. Were it adopted generally, it would
exert an especially forceful influence on the broader field of foreign affairs law,
which frequently invokes history, practice, tradition, and similar non-textual
considerations. It is also essential to understanding what Holland necessarily
held—and why Bond and Holland cannot be reconciled. So at the risk of
belaboring Holland’s analysis, it is instructive to consider this passage in
greater depth.
Holmes began with the proposition that the treaty power is not just an
alternative method by which the federal government may exercise in the
international sphere the same congressional powers enumerated in Article I,
Section 8; rather, Article II, Section 2, the treaty power, is a separate and
independent source of federal lawmaking power. It both complements and
augments Congress’s enumerated powers. The Treaty Clause gives the federal
government—in particular, the “treaty-makers,”57 viz., the President plus twothirds of the Senate58—the power to make national law by international means:
“It is obvious,” Holmes wrote, “that there may be matters of the sharpest
exigency that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed
by such an act could.”59
For Holland’s critics, of course, it was, and is, not at all obvious. But
Holmes did not believe that the Framers, with the experience under the Articles
fresh in their minds, created a Constitution that would disable the United States
as a nation from exercising the same powers as other nations, including the
power to make internationally lawful treaties. International law, of course, does
not place federalism constraints on treaties; and it is definitional of a nation that
it has full capacity to enter into relations with other nations.60 The Constitution
itself, for Holmes, established a fully empowered and functional nation. That is
why, as he concluded, this authority must be found somewhere in the nation’s
government.61 Yet in the federalist structure of the United States, it does not
56. Holland, 252 U.S. at 432-34 (citations omitted).
57. See generally HENKIN, supra note 24, at 175-214.
58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
59. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
60. See, e.g., Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933,
165 L.N.T.S. 19.
61. This conclusion might at first seem redolent of Justice Sutherland’s notoriously
problematic theory in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)—viz., that
sovereignty provides the federal government, and in particular, in Sutherland’s view, the President, with
an extra-Constitutional source of power—although Curtiss-Wright postdates Holland. Yet Holmes
clearly meant to interpret the Constitution itself. Nothing in Holland suggests any dubious thesis about
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reside in the states. Nor could it. The national experience under the Articles
established as much. And the nation’s history and experience since 1789,
especially the Civil War (in which Holmes fought and to which he alluded in
Holland) put any residual doubts on this issue to rest.
Not coincidentally, Holmes’s reference to “matters of the sharpest
exigency for the national well being” echoes Marshall’s proclamation in
McCulloch v. Maryland. The Treaty Clause, like the Necessary and Proper
Clause, is part of
a constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted
to the various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by which
government should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have been to
change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal
code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for
exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be
62
best provided for as they occur.

Marshall’s words aptly capture Holmes’s answer to the question of the
appropriate test, as he put it, of the treaty power. Given the “character of the
[Constitution],” the treaty power’s scope and limits were not frozen for all time
by “immutable rules,” which the Constitution set out in 1789. It is not
accidental that the Article II power to make treaties, unlike Congress’s Article I
power to make laws, does not enumerate an exclusive list of allowable subjects
for treaties. The treaty power must be sufficiently flexible to adapt to the
exigencies of governing a nation “for ages to come.”63 It must be robust
enough to handle crises “which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly,
and which can be best provided for as they occur.”64
3. The Andrews Analogy
Holmes’s reference to Andrews v. Andrews65 is far more significant in
this regard than scholars have recognized. It clarifies the nature and force of
Holland’s rationale. A routine estate dispute in Massachusetts, Andrews may at
first seem to be no more than a convenient source for a poignant quotation. It
reached the Supreme Court only because the plaintiff invoked the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, 66 injecting a federal question into an otherwise
quintessential state-law dispute in which the decedent’s ex-wife and second
wife each sought appointment as administratrix of his estate. The local issues in
Andrews scarcely seem relevant to the international issues in Holland.
Yet Andrews clarifies Holland’s functional rationale. While Holmes did
not offer details about the case, his remark on it is informative: “What was said
extraconstitutional foreign-affairs powers. See Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional
Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 379 (2000).
62. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819); see also THE FEDERALIST
No. 23, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
63. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415.
64. Id.
65. 188 U.S. 14, 33 (1903), abrogated by Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). Sherrer’s
abrogation of Andrews does not affect how the latter informs the rationale in Holland: What matters is
Justice White’s rationale and his constitutional methodology, not the validity of his conclusion.
66. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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in [Andrews] with regard to the powers of the States applies with equal force to
the powers of the nation in cases where the States individually are incompetent
to act.”67 The gravamen of Justice White’s opinion for the Court in Andrews
was that the Constitution established a functional nation. It should therefore be
construed, in the event of ambiguity or uncertainty, to effectively lodge every
legal power indispensable to a well-ordered nation in a government, state or
federal, of that nation. Understanding Andrews’s relevance to Holland requires
a brief review of the former’s facts.
Charles Andrews sought to divorce his first wife, Kate. But the law of his
domicile, Massachusetts, disallowed it. He therefore moved to South Dakota
for the short period of time needed to establish residence, secured a divorce
decree in South Dakota state court, and then returned to Massachusetts. A year
later, he married his second wife, Annie. When he died five years later, Annie
and Kate each claimed the right to administer his estate. The trial court, while
observing that Kate had unscrupulously “connived at and acquiesced in the
South Dakota divorce decree,” found that she nonetheless retained the “right to
administer his estate as his lawful widow,”68 for Massachusetts law prohibited
Charles’s conduct and directed its courts not to recognize the South Dakota
divorce decree.69 Because that decree could not be enforced in Massachusetts,
Kate remained the decedent’s lawful spouse and administratrix of his estate.
Annie countered that the Full Faith and Credit Clause preempted Massachusetts
state law and compelled its courts to enforce the decree, making her, not Kate,
the administratrix.
Andrews’s relevance can now be fully appreciated. In the United States of
1903, legally codified cultural norms conceived of marriage as a vital social
institution. Andrews, citing earlier decisions, went so far as to describe
marriage as “an essential attribute of government . . . upon which the existence
of civilized society depends.”70 The Constitution does not, obviously, delegate
power over marriage to the federal government; it is a power reserved to the
states. But just as in Holland applying the treaty power despite what might
ordinarily be Tenth Amendment reserved rights over the legal regulation of
migratory birds generated a conundrum, so too, in Andrews, did applying the
Full Faith and Credit Clause to the reserved authority of the states over
marriage. The Constitution apparently required Massachusetts to give full faith
and credit to, and hence enforce, the very divorce decree that its own law
prohibited. One law or the other, state or federal, had to yield.
A formal reading of the Constitution would have required that federal law
prevail: A decree rendered in one state must be given full faith and credit in the
courts of every other. 71 The Constitution therefore seemed to require
Massachusetts to enforce the South Dakota divorce decree in its courts even
though its own state law prohibited just that. But the Andrews Court reasoned
that so applying the Full Faith and Credit Clause to marriage would effectively
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
Andrews, 188 U.S. at 17.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30-31 (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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deprive the domiciliary state of its reserved right under the Tenth Amendment
to regulate marriage: a citizen of one state could evade its marriage laws, as did
Charles, by the expedient of residing briefly in another state with lax marriage
laws, obtaining a divorce decree there, returning to his domicile, and then
enforcing the out-of-state decree in its courts—notwithstanding any domiciliary
state law to the contrary, which the Constitution would preempt.
Justice White declined to construe the Constitution to require this
dysfunctional result. Because, he noted, the Full Faith and Credit Clause could
divest the states of their reserved right to regulate marriage, and yet the
Constitution does not delegate that power to the federal government, it would
result that, in practice, neither the states nor the federal government could
effectively regulate marriage—a social institution “upon which the existence of
civilized society depends,” and further, one which “ha[d] always been subject
to the control of the [state] legislature.”72 To interpret the Constitution in
Andrews to nullify Massachusetts state marital law would therefore be to
prioritize form over substance. It would “presuppos[e] that the determination of
what powers are reserved and what delegated by the Constitution is to be
ascertained by a blind adherence to mere form, in disregard of the substance of
things. But the settled rule is directly to the contrary.”73 The Court concluded
that it would be untenable to interpret the Constitution to “destroy”—that is, to
deprive government in the aggregate (state and federal) of—the effective legal
power to regulate marriage, a social institution indispensable to government.74
The same principle, Holmes reasoned in Holland, applies, mutatis
mutandis, to the treaty power. It would be untenable to construe the
Constitution to deprive the federal government of the power to make and
implement treaties indispensable to the nation the Constitution established “for
ages to come.”75 Treaties, like the social institution of marriage during the
Andrews era, are “an essential attribute of government.”76 To insist that the
treaty power cannot be exercised if the subject would otherwise be reserved to
the states would be to render an important class of treaties beyond the authority
of any government of the United States—state or federal. For it would be
implausible to suppose that treaties could be coordinated and enforced
uniformly by the states. The treaty power is among the “powers of the nation . . .
where the States individually are incompetent to act.”77
Holland, in brief, applied the constitutional logic of Andrews—viz., to
oversimplify somewhat, that the Court should construe tensions in the text to
enable the Constitution to function effectively given evolving national interests
and needs—to a converse situation in terms of whether, functionally, federal or
state law should prevail: in Andrews, that logic prioritized state law; in
Holland, federal. But the principle in each case is the same: a contrary holding

72. Andrews, 188 U.S. at 30.
73. Id. at 33.
74. Id. (“This would be but to declare that, in a necessary aspect, government had been
destroyed by the adoption of the Constitution.”); cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920).
75. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
76. Andrews, 188 U.S. at 31.
77. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
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would interpret the Constitution to deprive government (in the aggregate, state
and federal) of power to regulate “a subject . . . upon which the existence of
civilized society depends,” 78 a power indispensable to the nation’s “well
being,”79 and perhaps even to its “existence.”80 Neither Justice White nor
Justice Holmes thought a sound interpretation of the Constitution, which
establishes the United States as a nation, compels a conclusion that
disempowers and diminishes that nation.
C. An Anachronism?
The preservation of migratory birds may not strike the modern reader as a
“national interest of very nearly the first magnitude.” 81 Nor would many
citizens today describe the social institution of marriage as indispensable to the
“existence” of civilized society.82 But it would be mistaken to dismiss the logic
of these cases as anachronistic. At the time of Holland, migratory birds were,
the Court emphasized, a crucial “food supply” and “protectors of our forests
and our crops.”83 The federal government’s need to prevent their extinction by
entering into a treaty—after lower courts had struck down its earlier effort to
accomplish the same objective through the use of Congress’s Article I powers
alone—is itself evidence of just how important this national interest was at the
time. And whatever the truth of Justice Holmes’s characterization of the need
to protect migratory birds, or of Justice White’s description of marriage, the
principle advanced in both cases is no less forceful: the Constitution need not
and should not be read to disable government (again, understood in the
aggregate, federal and state) from legislating effectively on matters of national
significance.
Holmes stressed in Holland that a vital national interest could “be
protected only by national action in concert with that of another power.”84
Without the doctrine established in Holland, such vital national interests, then
as now, would be beyond the power of the United States to safeguard and
promote. That is the gravamen of Holmes’s argument: a Constitution intended
to function effectively for the ages and to adapt to the exigencies of a constantly
evolving nation should not be read to deny government the power to protect
indispensable interests of the nation it constitutes.85
As we will see in Part V, despite its relatively modest influence in the
past century, contemporary international law and dramatic changes in the
78. Andrews, 188 U.S. at 31.
79. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
80. Andrews, 188 U.S. at 31; cf. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.
81. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.
82. On the other hand, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), suggests that citizens
continue to perceive marriage as a critical social institution.
83. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. Holmes did not argue that “need implies power,” a dangerously illiberal argument. He
accepted that the Constitution limits as well as empowers government, and he suggested that limits on
the treaty power exist. He denied, however, that those limits were properly to be ascertained simply by
checking the list of Congress’s enumerated powers. Again, there is no “plausible reason to suppose that
the treaty power can extend only to subjects within Congress’s enumerated powers.” Lawson &
Seidman, supra note 41, at 11.
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global legal order mean that Holland’s reconciliation of the treaty power with
federalism remains even more vital to the national interest today. Only that
reconciliation enables the Constitution to endure in this regard and to “adapt[]
to the various crises of human affairs” we face in the twenty-first century.86
Given the consensus that Bond did not overrule or substantially modify
Holland’s core doctrine, however, why is there cause for concern? Because, as
we explain in the next part, the consensus is wrong: Bond eviscerated Holland.
III. HOW BOND HOBBLED HOLLAND
In 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review United States v.
Bond,87 which squarely posed the issue in Holland for the first time in nearly a
century. The film noir facts of the case generated no few chuckles. In 1997, the
United States ratified the Convention on Chemical Weapons (CWC or
Convention).88 It requires the parties to prohibit certain activities set forth in
the Convention, including by “enacting penal legislation.”89 The prohibited
activities include the development, possession, or use of chemical weapons,
which the CWC defines as “[t]oxic chemicals and their precursors,” which, in
turn, it defines broadly as “[a]ny chemical which through its chemical action on
life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to
humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin
or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced
in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.”90 Congress implemented the CWC in
1998.91 The CWC Implementation Act, modeled closely on the Convention’s
language, made it a federal crime to develop, possess, or use chemical
weapons.92
In 2006, Carol Anne Bond, a microbiologist, discovered that her friend
Myrlinda Haynes was pregnant by Bond’s husband. Seeking revenge, Bond
stole toxic chemicals from her employer and ordered others on the Internet. On
at least twenty-four occasions between November 2006 and June 2007, she
spread these chemicals on Haynes’s car door, mailbox, and doorknob. Bond did
not intend to kill Haynes; rather, she “hoped that Haynes would touch the
chemicals and develop an uncomfortable rash.”93 Because the chemicals were
readily noticeable, however, Haynes avoided them except on one occasion,
when she suffered a minor burn to her thumb. Haynes repeatedly reported
Bond’s conduct to the police. Eventually, they referred her reports to the postal
service, which set up surveillance and filmed Bond stealing from Haynes’s
mailbox and stuffing chemicals into her car muffler.
Federal prosecutors indicted Bond for mail theft and—perhaps because

86. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
87. 681 F.3d 149, 149-70 (3d Cir. 2012).
88. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317.
89. Id. art. VII.
90. Id. art. II.
91. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (2014).
92. Id. at 2085.
93. Id.
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this charge alone failed to capture the seriousness of Bond’s attempted
assaults—also for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 229, the main criminal provision
of the Act. Bond moved to dismiss this charge on two grounds. First, while
conceding that her conduct could not technically be characterized as a
statutorily exempt “peaceful purpose[],” 94 she argued that this exemption
implied that the Act should not be read to reach non-“warlike” conduct.
Second, she argued that, if it did, the Act “exceeded Congress’s enumerated
powers and invaded powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.”95
The Third Circuit rejected her arguments, relying, in the latter case, on Holland
to sustain section 229 as “necessary and proper to carry the [CWC] into
effect.”96
A. The Court’s Attempt to Sidestep Holland
Because the federal government disavowed reliance on the Commerce
Clause as the basis for section 229,97 leaving implementation of the CWC
through the Necessary and Proper Clause as the statute’s only potential
constitutional basis, Bond offered the Court an opportunity, were it so inclined,
to overrule Holland. But the majority did not seem so inclined. It instead chose
to decide the case on statutory grounds, thereby avoiding—or so it thought—
the need to revisit the constitutional issue it had decided in Holland. And since
the Court’s decision, a consensus has indeed emerged that, for better or worse,
the Bond Court successfully elided Holland and managed to leave its core
holding undisturbed.98
According to this now-orthodox view, the Court dodged the issue in
Holland by applying the canon of constitutional avoidance and resolving Bond
on statutory grounds alone. That is, in fact, not only the consensus among
commentators; it is how all of the Justices evidently understood the majority
opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Kennedy,
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito,
who concurred in the judgment despite vehement disagreement with the
majority opinion, nonetheless understood it as the majority did.99
The Supreme Court, so this reading of the case continues, essentially
embraced the statutory interpretation of the Act that the Third Circuit had
rejected.100 Avoiding consideration of the Tenth Amendment’s interaction with
94. Id. at 2086.
95. Id.
96. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 162 (3d Cir. 2012).
97. See id. at 168-69.
98. To the best of our knowledge, all commentary on Bond to date takes this position. See
supra note 7. For earlier media commentary, see, among many other examples, Adam Liptak, Chemical
Weapons Treaty Does Not Apply to Petty Crime, Justices Rule, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2014, at A13, and
Ronald J. Bettauer, Supreme Court Limits Holding in Bond, Not Reaching Constitutional Treaty
Implementation Authority, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS (June 25, 2014), http://www.asil.org/insights
/volume/18/issue/14/supreme-court-limits-holding-bond-not-reaching-constitutional-treaty.
99. See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2094-97 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justices Thomas
and Alito adopted Justice Scalia’s analysis in this regard. See id. at 2102 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
100. The Third Circuit, like the concurring Supreme Court Justices, concluded that the
constitutional question could not be avoided because “while one may well question whether Congress
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the Treaty Clause, the Court read the Act narrowly such that it did not need to
revisit Holland: Roberts found it implausible to construe the Act as
criminalizing Bond’s pedestrian efforts at revenge for marital infidelity.
Congress enacted the Act, Roberts concluded, to implement the CWC’s ban on
chemical weapons—not, as he colorfully wrote, to define chemical weapons so
broadly as to “sweep in everything from the detergent under the kitchen sink to
the stain remover in the laundry room” or to “make[] it a federal offense to
poison goldfish.”101
In short, by construing the Act’s text narrowly and inferring that
Congress did not intend to criminalize conduct such as Bond’s, the majority
rendered section 229 unobjectionable from a federalism perspective. The Court
concluded that the Act simply did not reach any conduct vouchsafed to the
states by the Tenth Amendment. Roberts thereby obviated any need for the
Court to decide whether the Act—if it were interpreted to sweep more broadly,
and if it were found to intrude upon traditional state functions absent a treaty—
could nonetheless be constitutionally sustained as necessary and proper to
implement the CWC under the doctrine it had adopted in Holland.
A cursory reading of the majority opinion indeed seems to bear out this
view of the majority opinion and therefore to minimize Bond’s import. Roberts
summarized the potential stakes in the Holland debate only to dismiss it as
needless to resolve Bond. 102 He began with the canon of constitutional
avoidance: that, as a rule, “the Court will not decide a constitutional question if
there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case.” 103
Consequently, he considered whether a non-constitutional ground to resolve
Bond existed and concluded that Bond’s statutory argument—that the Act,
properly interpreted, did not reach her misconduct—supplied a sound one.
Despite the Act’s facially broad language, Roberts found “no reason to
think the sovereign nations that ratified the Convention were interested in
anything like Bond’s common law assault”; and at any rate, “nothing prevents
Congress from implementing the Convention in the same manner it legislates
with respect to innumerable other matters—observing the Constitution’s
division of responsibility between sovereigns and leaving the prosecution of
purely local crimes to the States.”104 The gravamen of Roberts’s argument is
therefore clear: The Act excludes Bond’s conduct because the correct statutory
construction of section 229, the one consistent with its text and Congress’s
presumed intent, renders it inapplicable to “purely local crimes.”105

envisioned the Act being applied in a case like this, the language itself does cover Bond’s criminal
conduct. . . . [T]he statute speaks with sufficient certainty that we feel compelled to consider the hard
question presented in this appeal.” Bond, 681 F.3d at 155.
101. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2091. The majority concluded that “[t]here is no reason to suppose that
Congress—in implementing the Convention on Chemical Weapons—thought” that “the global need to
prevent chemical warfare [requires] the Federal Government to reach into the kitchen cupboard, or to
treat a local assault with a chemical irritant as the deployment of a chemical weapon.” Id. at 2093.
102. See id. at 2087.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2090.
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B. Why the Court’s Attempt to Sidestep Holland Failed
1. The Neglect of Holland’s Own Federalism Principles
Despite the Court’s efforts, a close analysis of Bond reveals that it failed
to sidestep the constitutional issues in Holland for at least three related reasons,
summarized here and further elaborated below.
First, recall that after citing the canon of constitutional avoidance, the
Court proceeded from the premise that it “[f]ortunately [had] no need to
interpret the scope of the Convention . . . . Bond was prosecuted under [section
229], and the statute—unlike the Convention—must be read consistent with
principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional structure.”106 So framed
by the Court, this premise is mistaken. To be sure, it is conceivable that this
quotation reflects no more than ill-considered language. But the balance of the
majority opinion suggests otherwise, and it is difficult to reconcile this
statement with Holland. If the majority meant that treaty-implementing
legislation must be read “consistent with” the same “principles of federalism
inherent in our constitutional structure” as those that apply to legislation that
does not implement a treaty, that proposition is manifestly inconsistent with
Holland. 107 Whatever else Holland held, there can be no question that it
distinguished between federalism constraints on laws that do and do not
implement treaties.
Second, the same quotation reflects the Court’s struggle to avoid
revisiting Holland. If we assume, as did every member of the Court, that the
majority succeeded, then Holland remains good law and binding precedent.
That, in turn, means that “principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional
structure,” as authoritatively interpreted by the Court itself, do not conflict with
Holland’s doctrine; they incorporate it. Holland’s resolution of the tension
between the treaty power and the Tenth Amendment, in other words, is among
the “principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional structure.” It is also
among the federalism principles that the Court invoked and therefore should
have applied when it enlisted the constitutional avoidance canon in support of
its resolution of section 229’s perceived ambiguity. Yet the Bond Court did
not—as stare decisis and respect for precedent generally require—adhere to
Holland’s conclusion about federalism principles in the context of a treatyimplementing statute.
Third, Holland held that a treaty and its implementing legislation must be
appraised together under the Tenth Amendment; if the treaty is valid in this
regard, so too is its implementing legislation. Bond proceeded from the
contrary premise that the “statute—unlike the [treaty]—must be read consistent
with principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional structure.”108 The
106. See id. at 2088.
107. Had Holland truly been treated as good law by the majority, the Act at issue in Bond
would not have presented an ordinary case of statutory interpretation—to be resolved in conformity with
the same federalism principles that apply to a statute that does not implement a treaty. Bond mistakenly
applied the same methodology as the federal district courts that had appraised the 1916 Migratory Bird
Treaty Act before the Court’s decision in Holland.
108. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088.
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majority further reasoned that “nothing prevents Congress from implementing
the Convention in the same manner it legislates with respect to innumerable
other matters—observing the Constitution’s division of responsibility between
sovereigns and leaving the prosecution of purely local crimes to the States.”109
The majority’s assertion would ordinarily be unobjectionable. Nations frame
multilateral treaties in terms that enable them to implement international legal
obligations so as not to violate internal laws. Bond’s conflict with Holland in
this regard arises because the majority’s premise—viz., that legislation to
implement treaties must comply with the same federalism principles as apply to
legislation that does not—directly contravenes Holland. Were that so, a treaty
and its implementing legislation could be assessed independently under the
Tenth Amendment, notwithstanding Holland’s insistence to the contrary, viz.,
that a treaty’s validity vis-à-vis federalism renders its implementing legislation
valid under the Tenth Amendment—as necessary and proper to implement the
treaty.110
2. Holland’s Uniform Standard: Treaties and Implementing
Legislation
Each prong of the majority’s analysis depended ineluctably on the last of
these flawed reasons—never acknowledged as such, still less justified—
namely, that the implementing legislation (the Act) and the treaty it implements
(the CWC) may be appraised independently under the Tenth Amendment.
Introducing the balance of the majority’s analysis, Roberts thus wrote that “the
statute—unlike the Convention—must be read consistent with principles of
federalism inherent in our constitutional structure.”111 Under Holland, that’s
wrong. The validity of the CWC and the Act must be assessed together;
logically, the two are inextricably linked. Holland held, among other things,
that under the Tenth Amendment, if the treaty is constitutionally valid, so is its
implementing legislation; if the treaty is not, neither is its implementing
legislation. Roberts could interpret the Act not to reach purely local crimes only
by neglecting, indeed subverting, this essential premise of Holland: The
constitutional validity of an Article II treaty determines the validity under the
Tenth Amendment of its implementing legislation.
Holmes could not have made this more explicit: “If the treaty is valid,
there can be no dispute about the [Tenth Amendment] validity of the statute
under Article I, Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the
powers of the Government.” 112 That is why, recall, Holmes recast the
constitutional question in Holland to focus on the treaty’s validity rather than
that of the implementing legislation: “The language of the Constitution as to the
supremacy of treaties being general, the question before us is narrowed to an
inquiry into the ground upon which the present supposed exception [to the

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 2087.
See 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088.
Holland, 252 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added).
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treaty power] is placed.”113 Recall, too, that by “exception,” Holmes meant
exception to the treaty power based on the Tenth Amendment, not exception to
the Necessary and Proper Clause.114 In other words, the Tenth Amendment
validity of the implementing legislation is derivative of and determined by the
Tenth Amendment validity of the treaty. 115 That is why Holmes could
conclude without hesitation that the holdings of the two federal district courts
striking down similar laws—laws that did not, however, implement a treaty—
were irrelevant to the real issue in Holland. In contrast, Carey v. South
Dakota,116 which found the 1913 Migratory Bird Act unconstitutional, did not
raise the “test of the treaty power”117 at issue in Holland. Holmes accordingly
prioritized analysis of the treaty. He assessed the validity of the treaty, not its
implementing legislation, in light of the Tenth Amendment.
Holland therefore began with the text of the 1916 treaty between the
United States and the United Kingdom concerning the preservation of
migratory birds. It “provided . . . that the two powers would take or propose to
their lawmaking bodies the necessary measures for carrying the treaty out.”118
Those measures, the implementing legislation challenged by Missouri, were
passed “to give effect to the convention.”119 For the Holland Court, however,
the validity of that convention, not its implementing legislation, determined the
Tenth Amendment’s relevance vel non.
After reframing the question, appropriately, as an “inquiry into the
ground upon which the present supposed exception [to the treaty power based
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. As part of the resurgence of federalism in the 1980s and 1990s, the Supreme Court
established federalism limits on the Necessary and Proper Clause itself. It is therefore arguable that,
even before Bond, these limits abrogated Holland’s holding that the treaty power enables Congress to
regulate some subjects beyond those enumerated in Article I, Section 8 (or delegated elsewhere to the
federal government). Principles of federalism now apply also, and directly, to limit the ambit of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 924 (1997) (finding that a federal law that “violates the principle of state sovereignty” can never be
necessary and proper to execute Congress’s powers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160-62
(1992) (holding that although the federal government had the power to regulate the radioactive waste at
issue, the Tenth Amendment limited the means by which it could do so because federalism limits the
Necessary and Proper Clause itself); accord Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592
(2012); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728-29 (1999). Because federalism now directly constrains the
Necessary and Proper Clause vis-à-vis Article I, it is technically an open question (especially bearing in
mind that this body of case law postdates Holland by decades) whether the same constraints apply to
legislation necessary and proper to implement an otherwise valid treaty. In other words, do federalism
limits on the Necessary and Proper Clause in the context of Congress’s Article I enumerated powers
alone apply equally to Congress’s powers to implement a treaty concluded by the President and Senate
under Article II? In our view, the arguments advanced in this Article in support of Holland’s analysis of
putative Tenth Amendment limits on Congress’s substantive enumerated powers to effectuate a treaty
apply with equal force to the limits now imposed by the Court on the means at Congress’s disposal
under the Necessary and Proper Clause. The logic of Holland does not depend in any obvious way on
such a means-ends distinction. But it is conceivable that the prohibition on commandeering state
political institutions, for example, might apply to a statute that would otherwise be necessary and proper
to implement a treaty.
115. Again, implementing legislation might, of course, be unconstitutional for other reasons,
such as a violation of the Bill of Rights. E.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957). Holland involved
only its constitutionality under the Tenth Amendment. Holmes did not consider issues like prosecutorial
discretion (surely a question in Bond) or the Necessary and Proper Clause’s rational basis requirement.
116. Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118 (1919).
117. Holland, 252 U.S. at 432.
118. Id. at 431.
119. Id.
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on the Tenth Amendment] is placed,”120 Holmes thus considered the state’s
principal argument: that “a treaty cannot be valid if it infringes the
Constitution,” in particular federalism limits, and that “what an act of Congress
could not do unaided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the States, a
treaty cannot do.”121 This is the core argument—an argument that turns on the
treaty’s validity—that Holland considered and rejected: “The treaty in
question,” Holmes reasoned, not the implementing legislation, “does not
contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution.”122 He also
recognized that “but for the treaty,” not the implementing legislation, “the State
would be free to regulate this subject itself.”123 Consequently, he concluded,
“the treaty and statute must be upheld.”124
3. The Unavoidable Conflict Between Holland and Bond
Now reconsider Bond. The justices took the constitutional validity of the
treaty for granted.125 They did not question that the CWC involves “a national
interest of very nearly the first magnitude,” deals with an issue as to which “the
States individually are incompetent to act,” or requires “action in concert” with
other nations.126 In short, they did not regard the CWC’s constitutionality as
the relevant issue. Here again, the Bond Court’s abandonment of Holland
emerges clearly in Roberts’s proclamation that the Court had “no need to
interpret the scope of the Convention” because Bond was prosecuted under
[section 229], and the statute—unlike the Convention—must be read consistent
with principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional structure.”127
These words, and the balance of the analysis predicated upon them, mark
a dramatic departure from Holland. The Holland defendants, too, were
prosecuted under a law that Congress had enacted to implement a treaty. Unlike
the Bond Court, however, the Holland Court did not state or imply that this law
“must be read consistent with principles of federalism inherent in our
constitutional structure.”128 Justice Holmes held to the contrary that, for Tenth
Amendment purposes, a valid treaty renders generic “principles of federalism
inherent in our constitutional structure” nugatory as putative limits on
congressional power to implement that treaty. Assuming it to be, as both Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Holmes did, an otherwise constitutional treaty,
Holland thus held immaterial the very same canon of statutory construction
that Bond held mandatory. Stated otherwise, in the context of treatyimplementing legislation, Holmes characterized Bond’s “principles of
federalism inherent in our constitutional structure” as an irrelevant “invisible
120. Id. at 432.
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 433 (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 434 (“No doubt the great body of private relations usually fall within the control of
the State, but a treaty may override its power.”).
124. Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
125. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014); accord id. at 2098 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
126. See id. at 2083-84.
127. Id. at 2088.
128. Id.
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radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment.”129
Consider also the sharp (and irreconcilable) distinction between how
Justice Holmes and Chief Justice Roberts framed the issue in, respectively,
Holland and Bond—notwithstanding that each case arose in substantially the
same posture and raised substantially the same constitutional question. Holmes
focused first and foremost on the treaty: The precise “question before us,” he
wrote, “[can now be] narrowed to an inquiry into the ground upon which the
present supposed exception [to the treaty power] is placed.”130 Chief Justice
Roberts, in contrast, focused foremost, indeed exclusively, on the implementing
legislation: “The question presented . . . is whether the Implementation Act . . .
reaches a purely local crime.”131 In fact, in the Bond Court’s view, this focus
obviated the need to consider the treaty.
4. Bond’s Misguided “Background Principle”
Only by rejecting Holland’s insistence on the mutual dependence of the
treaty and its implementing legislation for Tenth Amendment purposes could
the Bond Court shift its focus to the statute alone, which it then analyzed as
though it were a routine exercise in statutory interpretation. And only by
abandoning Holland could the Bond Court conclude that the Tenth Amendment
constrained the reach of the Act. In contrast to Holland, Bond treated the
federalism-based canon of constitutional avoidance as mandatory.
The orthodox reading of Bond interprets the majority opinion to introduce
a clear statement rule in the context of laws implementing treaties: Congress
must be explicit if it intends implementing legislation to abrogate the usual
limitations imposed by federalism. Illustrative of this reading is Professor
Bradley’s conclusion that “[Bond] extends a federalism-based clear statement
requirement, which was originally developed by the Supreme Court in the
context of purely domestic legislation, into the realm of treaty-implementing
legislation.”132
To be sure, much language in the Bond opinion seemingly lends itself to
this view. The Court characterized the clear statement rule as a “background
principle[] of construction”133 and “conclude[d] that, in this curious case, we
can insist on a clear indication that Congress meant to reach purely local crimes
before interpreting the statute’s expansive language in a way that intrudes on
the police power of the States.”134 In part because of such statements, it is
understandable that Bond has been read to impose a modest clear-statement
rule on treaty-implementing legislation rather than to abandon (or even reach)
the constitutional issue in Holland.
The Supreme Court could have, plausibly if controversially,135 held that
129. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
130. Id. at 432.
131. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2083 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2088.
132. Bradley, supra note 7, at 493.
133. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088.
134. Id. at 2090.
135. Justice Scalia, like the Third Circuit, argued that textualism sufficed to show that the Act
reached Bond’s conduct and left no room for ambiguity. Id. at 2094.
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the Act did not reach Bond’s conduct by means of a variety of canons of
statutory interpretation—without invoking the canon of constitutional
avoidance based on federalism; after all, as Karl Llewelyn famously pointed
out, there’s no shortage of them available to support particular results.136 But
the Court saw the federalism background principle and canon as all but
determinative, the principal factor that resolved section 229’s perceived
ambiguity.
We have repeatedly quoted the Court’s analytic predicate that “the
statute—unlike the Convention—must be read consistent with principles of
federalism in our constitutional structure”137 because it so clearly underscores
Bond’s abandonment of Holland. It also directly illustrates the Court’s
misguided assumptions: first, that a mandatory federalism limit applies to laws
implementing valid treaties; and, second, that the statute and treaty may be
assessed separately under the Tenth Amendment. Holland rejected both of
these assumptions. Still, lest it seem that this is a case of cherry-picking one
misguided quotation, note that the quoted proposition is not an anomaly. The
majority’s analysis relied on it. Roberts stressed, time and again, that
interpreting section 229 to reach Bond’s local crimes would raise serious
constitutional questions based on the structural principle that the federal
government exercises only delegated powers and that crimes such as Bond’s
would ordinarily fall within the state’s “police power.” In sum, the Court’s
pervasive reliance on a federalism “background principle” and canon of
constitutional avoidance to resolve section 229’s ambiguity was not just one
factor among many; it was, in the majority’s view, dispositive.138
From the perspective of the orthodox reading, one might raise the
following objection: Leave aside the Tenth Amendment. The majority did not
try to avoid deciding whether the Act violates that Amendment; it only sought
to resolve section 229’s perceived ambiguity without considering whether
Holland remains good law.139 The easiest way to accomplish this was to apply
a routine canon of avoidance that counsels construing the Act such that
Holland’s continuing validity would not affect the Act’s analysis regardless.
That is why the Court insisted on “a clear indication that Congress meant to
136. Karl N. Llewelyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396 (1950). The Bond majority indeed
referred to some of these principles. Roberts cited, for example, the Act’s ordinary meaning, context,
and purpose; the intention of the nations that ratified the CWC; the circumstances culminating in Bond’s
prosecution; the absurd results that would presumably follow from a broader reading of the Act; and
non-constitutional inferences about Congress’s intent in implementing the CWC. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at
2085-91.
137. Bond, 134 S. Ct at 2088.
138. See id. at 2086. It is unnecessary to catalogue every instance where the Court relied on the
avoidance canon predicated on pre-Holland federalism to construe section 229. A few examples suffice
to show the extent to which it pervades the Court’s statutory analysis. See, e.g., id. at 2086 (“A criminal
act committed wholly within a State cannot be made an offence against the United States, unless it have
some relation to the execution of a power of Congress, or to some matter within the jurisdiction of the
United States.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 2088 (stating that a contrary interpretation
would “dramatically intrude upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); id. at 2088-89 (mentioning federalism as a “background principle” of construction); id. at 2090
(“[I]t is appropriate to refer to basic principles of federalism embodied in the Constitution to resolve
ambiguity in a federal statute.”).
139. We thank Mike Dorf for pointing to the need for this clarification.
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reach purely local crimes, before interpreting the statute’s expansive language
in a way that intrudes on the police power of the States.”140 For if the Court
had not required this clear indication, then it would have needed to decide
whether the statute’s expansive language intruded on police powers vouchsafed
to the states by the Tenth Amendment. That is all, one might argue, the Court
did; it avoided the constitutional issue in Holland by assuming that for treatyimplementing legislation, as for other federal statutes, Congress legislates
mindful of the background principle that federalism limits the reach of federal
criminal law.
Yet if that characterization of the Court’s approach is accurate, the
majority misunderstood the implications of its analysis. After Holland, generic
federalism principles are no longer a sound reason to believe that a treatyimplementing statute violates the Tenth Amendment. The Bond Court’s
application of the constitutional avoidance canon on this basis, however,
assumes the contrary. Holland held, in relevant part, that an “invisible radiation
from the terms of the Tenth Amendment,”141 or in Chief Justice Roberts’s
substantively equivalent words, general “principles of federalism inherent in
our constitutional structure,”142 do not carve out an exception to the otherwise
plenary federal treaty power. That does not mean, as Holmes said, that there are
no limits on the treaty power.143 It does, however, mean that in the context of a
statute implementing a treaty, there are no limits based on general principles of
federalism. 144 Holland, like any other precedent of the Supreme Court
interpreting the Constitution, is (or was) itself part of the constitutional
principles (here, of federalism) that, according to the Court, Congress must be
presumed to respect when it legislates.145 The Court’s constitutional decisions
have the same legal status as the document’s text—Congress may not
supersede them. 146 The Court’s federalism background principle and
associated canon of constitutional avoidance are themselves inconsistent with
the Court’s own authoritative interpretation of the Tenth Amendment in
Holland,147 unless and until the Court expressly overrules the case.
140. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2090.
141. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434.
142. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088.
143. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
144. See HENKIN, supra note 24, at 193. Citing several scholars, Henkin speculates that “[t]he
Constitution probably protects some few states’ rights, activities, and properties against federal invasion,
even by treaty.” Though the Court has held that the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, is nonjusticiable, given that Clause’s specific “prohibitory words,” Holland, 252 U.S. at 433, it would, for
example, be doubtful that the treaty-makers could enter into a treaty requiring a state to adopt an
authoritarian government. HENKIN, supra note 24, at 193. Holland rejected the notion that abstract or
general principles of federalism, without more, constrain the federal government’s power to make
treaties under Article II or to implement them by means of Congress’s Article I, Section 8 power to
make laws necessary and proper to carry those treaties into effect.
145. Cf. DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2012); David Strauss, Common Law
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
146. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (citing City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 517-21 (1997)).
147. Roberts invoked the avoidance canon in an effort to decide Bond without being compelled
to revisit the constitutional issue in Holland. But the only reason there was a constitutional issue to avoid
was that the Court had tacitly rejected Holland. In the treaty context, the principles of federalism
inherent in our constitutional structure, which emanate from the Tenth Amendment, as the Court has
construed it, include Holland, thus obviating the same federalism concerns that, in Bond, animated its
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The point merits some elaboration. The Court began its analysis of
federalism in Part III.A of the Bond opinion by criticizing the government’s
interpretation of section 229, according to which the statute reaches local
crimes like Bond’s. It said that “this interpretation would dramatically intrude
upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction, and we avoid reading statutes to
have such reach in the absence of a clear indication that they do.”148 Then, at
the close of this Part, after exploring a series of cases (none of which, tellingly,
involved treaties) that invoked federalism as a principle of statutory
interpretation, the Court concluded:
These precedents make clear that it is appropriate to refer to basic principles of
federalism embodied in the Constitution to resolve ambiguity in a federal statute. In
this case, the ambiguity derives from the improbably broad reach of the key
statutory definition given the term—“chemical weapon”—being defined; the deeply
serious consequences of adopting such a boundless reading; and the lack of any
apparent need to do so in light of the context from which the statute arose—a treaty
about chemical warfare and terrorism. We conclude that, in this curious case, we
can insist on a clear indication that Congress meant to reach purely local crimes,
before interpreting the statute’s expansive language in a way that intrudes on the
149
police power of the States.

The problem with this conclusion is twofold. First, because section 229
implements a treaty, there is no dramatic intrusion upon traditional state
criminal jurisdiction—unless the Court has tacitly abandoned Holland. Second,
assuming, as the Bond Court implicitly did by trying to avoid the constitutional
issue in Holland, that the latter case remains good law, the presumption that
Congress legislates against a federalism background principle cannot do the
interpretive work that the majority supposed. In the treaty context, after
Holland, there is no reason to presume that Congress sought to preserve the
usual federal-state balance that obtains outside the treaty context. Rather, the
“principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional structure” include
Holland’s doctrine that those principles do not compel federalism constraints
on statutes implementing treaties. 150 Provided the Act were enacted to
implement a constitutionally valid treaty (as all of the Justices in Bond regarded
the CWC to be), generic “principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional
structure” would have been immaterial to, not the mandatory lodestar of,
statutory construction. And it would have been equally immaterial that the Act,
absent the treaty, might have intruded upon background principles of
federalism against which Congress may be assumed ordinarily to legislate.
invocation of the avoidance canon in the first place.
148. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Id. at 2090.
150. Id. The Court might, of course, have logically concluded that because the CWC does not
require implementation by federal criminal law, Congress exercised its discretion to respect general,
non-doctrinal federalism concerns in implementing the CWC. After all, the federal government routinely
does consider federalism when it negotiates treaties, and Congress may and likely does consider it as
well in deciding how to implement treaties. In Holland, in contrast, the 1916 treaty arguably required
Congress to intrude upon traditional federalism limits, and the evidence could not have been clearer that
Congress also intended to transgress those limits. Bond’s assumption that Congress sought to respect the
usual federal-state balance despite the CWC might be right; the legislative history behind the Act
apparently did not clarify Congress’s intent in this regard. But, after Holland, the Court cannot assume
that legislation implementing a treaty should be construed, if possible, to adhere to the same federalstate balance as in a purely domestic context.
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5. Carey v. South Dakota: The Constitutional Avoidance Canon in
Context
The prudential rationale for the canon of constitutional avoidance bears
emphasis. It adjures judges to avoid interpreting an ambiguous statute in a
manner that might raise a constitutional doubt—but only if another construction
is equally plausible. We need not defend any position here on the merits of the
Bond majority opinion’s approach to the Act’s statutory interpretation in
contrast to that of Justice Scalia’s concurrence.151 But it is instructive to call
attention to Scalia’s exasperation that, in his view, the majority misapplied the
canon of constitutional avoidance in order to find the implementing legislation
ambiguous based on federalism rather than, as it should have done, applied that
canon only if and after finding the statute ambiguous—and only because of that
ambiguity.152
It is ironic in this regard, but not coincidental, that in the absence of a
treaty, Justice Brandeis in Carey, like Chief Justice Roberts in Bond, also
applied the canon of constitutional avoidance to a federal statute (for Brandeis,
the Migratory Bird Act of 1913). For Brandeis’s opinion in Carey reveals how
Roberts misunderstood the real issue in Bond. In short, Roberts treated Bond as
the functional equivalent of Carey rather than Holland. But Carey arose under
a federal law that did not implement a treaty. That law, the 1913 Migratory
Bird Act, like the CWC Act in Bond, arguably raised Tenth Amendment issues,
especially given the Court’s precedents affirming state authority over the
regulation of migratory birds.153 But because of the treaty in Holland, unlike in
Carey (decided only the previous year), Justice Holmes found no place for the
canon of constitutional avoidance that Brandeis had applied in Carey. Brandeis
agreed—for in Holland, unlike in Carey, the question had been the
constitutional validity of the treaty and only derivatively that of the
implementing legislation.
In Carey, by contrast, the question had been the constitutionality of the
1913 law, which substantively resembled the 1916 Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
but did not implement a treaty. Yet in Bond, Chief Justice Roberts applied the
non-treaty analysis in Carey rather than the treaty analysis in Holland. It is
telling that Brandeis, Carey’s author, joined Holland without reservation.154
His distinct approaches to Carey and Holland, which he regarded as
constitutionally consistent, show that Brandeis agreed with Holmes that a treaty
fundamentally reorients the Tenth Amendment analysis.155
151. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2094 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
152. Id. at 2095-97.
153. See Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118, 120, 122 (1919).
154. The Tenth Amendment, that is, motivated Justice Brandeis to apply the constitutional
avoidance canon in Carey. Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that the same goes for Bond. But Carey did
not consider the constitutional test of the treaty power. Nor did Carey require the Supreme Court to
consider whether that test should include a federalism exemption to the treaty power, as did Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
155. Id. at 432-33. Just as the 1916 migratory bird treaty in Holland rendered general Tenth
Amendment limits irrelevant to its implementing statute, so too, in Bond—were it truly the case that it
did not overrule Holland—should the CWC have rendered Tenth Amendment limits irrelevant to its
implementing legislation.
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In sum, had Chief Justice Roberts honored Holland, the real question in
Bond would have been the federal government’s authority to enter into the
CWC itself notwithstanding potential limits imposed by the Tenth
Amendment.156 Justice Holmes did not (because he had no need to) speculate
on the comparable issue in Holland. He simply said that the Court did not mean
to imply that the treaty power has no limits.157 Under Holland, then, either a
treaty is beyond the federal government’s Article II power—that is, an
international agreement that the President plus two-thirds of the Senate may
never constitutionally conclude—or it is not. If it is beyond the treaty power,
then of course no statute to implement it could be constitutional. If it is not,
then “principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional structure” would
not apply to its implementing legislation, just as they would not apply to the
same treaty were it self-executing. Either Tenth Amendment limits apply to
both, or they apply to neither. And in the event of an arguable ambiguity in the
implementing legislation, mandatory application of the canon of constitutional
avoidance based on federalism principles would be erroneous—or at least,
contrary to what the Bond Court suggested, inconsistent with Holland.
Bond’s application of the avoidance canon, which it deemed mandatory,
not precatory, cannot be reconciled with Holland. There is only a reason to
apply the canon—only a constitutional issue to avoid—if one assumes, as the
Court did, that the statute might otherwise conflict with general principles of
federalism. But if the Court did not disturb Holland, as it supposed, there is no
worry that generic federalism principles call into question the Tenth
Amendment validity of a statute that implements a concededly constitutional
treaty—rendering the canon of constitutional avoidance superfluous. Instead,
the Bond Court relied on that canon, albeit among other principles of statutory
interpretation, to interpret a purportedly ambiguous statute one way rather than
another.
Because the Court did not see the presence of the CWC as relevant to the
Tenth Amendment appraisal of the Act, it decided Bond by asking if the Act
would be valid absent the treaty.158 And absent the treaty, the Bond Court held
that it was not only “appropriate to apply the background assumption that
Congress normally preserves the constitutional balance between the National
Government and the States” but also required by “the very structure of the
Constitution.”159 Had the Court, holding all else constant, employed that same
assumption in Holland, Missouri would have prevailed: the law implementing
the 1916 treaty would have been constitutionally required to conform to the
same “principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional structure”160 that
would have applied in the absence of the treaty; and the Supreme Court had
156. In theory, Congress might enact an absurdly broad or otherwise manifestly inappropriate
statute, ostensibly to implement a treaty—and that statute would be invalid. But it would not be invalid
because of the Tenth Amendment; it would be invalid because it would not be a genuinely necessary and
proper means to implement the treaty. Not surprisingly, given the political safeguards of federalism, the
Supreme Court has never had occasion to consider this issue.
157. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
158. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014).
159. Id. at 2091.
160. Id. at 2088.
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held in Geer and Carey, both of which arose in a non-treaty context, that the
regulation of the taking of migratory birds falls within the state’s police power
despite incidental effects on commerce. Applying Bond’s methodology in
Holland, the Court would therefore have been obliged to strike down the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act as a violation of the Tenth Amendment—for as
Holmes affirmed, “but for the treaty, the State would be free to regulate this
subject itself.”161 Consensus to the contrary notwithstanding, Bond abandoned
Holland.
IV. CRITIQUES OF HOLLAND: THEORY AND PRACTICE
Whether Holland’s substantive demise is cause for celebration is, of
course, a different question. Fears of Holland’s supposed implications have
never entirely receded. If we are right that Bond either effectively overruled
Holland or, at a minimum, eviscerated its foundations, a word on the likely
effects of this development is in order. In this and the following parts, we
consider, respectively, the force of the chief critiques of Holland and the
probable consequences, in a vastly changed international legal order, of the
Court having now hobbled Bond. We point out how abandoning Holland will
impede the United States’s ability to carry out certain international obligations.
We begin in the first Section with a brief review of the nation’s experience with
Holland in the century before Bond, for it supplies the appropriate empirical
light in which to assess the chief objections to and critiques of Holland. In the
latter two Sections, we then turn to the political and legal constraints, which,
we suggest, dramatically mitigate, if not obviate, the threats Holland allegedly
poses to our constitutional order.
A. Before Bond: States’ Rights, Individual Rights, and the Lessons of
History, Experience, and Jurisprudence
Holmes’s opinion has never lacked critics.162 It generated controversy
from the outset. Scholars almost immediately speculated about potential threats
Holland might pose to both state and individual rights.163 Nine years after
Holland, former Secretary of State and later Chief Justice Hughes launched a
broadside against Holland in a speech to the American Society of International
Law, arguing that the treaty power extends only to “properly” international
issues.164
161. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434.
162. Some commentators therefore bemoaned the Bond Court’s perceived refusal to revisit the
constitutional issue. See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, The Supreme Court Misses Its Chance to Limit the
Treaty Power, FORBES (June 12, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/06/12/the-supreme
-court-misses-its-chance-to-limit-the-treaty-power.
163. E.g., Thomas Reid Powell, Constitutional Law in 1919-20, 19 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12-13
(1920).
164. See Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 247 F.2d 538, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
(quoting Proc. Am. Soc’y Int’l L. 194, 196 (1929)), vacated as moot, 355 U.S. 64 (1957); see also Bond,
134 S. Ct. at 2110 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment), HENKIN, supra note 24, at 197, 471-72
n.87; Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Niagara Reservation, 56 COLUM. L.
REV. 1151 (1956); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 117 (1965).
Hughes’s objections reflected those made by Thomas Jefferson early in the nation’s history. See David
M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of
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After World War II, Holland also provoked a political backlash. The
postwar rise of international institutions and multilateral human rights treaties
raised fears among some politicians that treaties would intrude upon national
sovereignty. Foremost in the mind of many were worries that such treaties
might empower the federal government to enact civil rights legislation that
would preempt state segregation and other racially discriminatory laws. In
1953, these fears culminated in Ohio Senator Bricker’s proposal of the
infamous Bricker Amendment, which sought to overrule Holland by amending
the Constitution to add that “[a] treaty shall become effective as internal law in
the United States only through legislation that would be valid in the absence of
a treaty.”165 The most prominent variation of the Amendment narrowly failed
after President Eisenhower opposed it.166 But many continued to fear that
Holland could be used to avoid all constitutional limits—not only, as Holmes
had more judiciously put it, “some invisible radiation from the general terms of
the Tenth Amendment.”167 The Supreme Court found a welcome opportunity
to put that fear to rest—or at least attempt to do so—in 1957.
In Reid v. Covert, 168 the plaintiffs argued that Article 2(11) of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice—which, in conformity with executive statusof-forces agreements, authorized the trial of civilian dependents of military
service members abroad by court-martial—deprived them of due process under
the Constitution.169 Echoing Holland, the government countered that Article
2(11) could be “sustained as legislation which is necessary and proper to carry
out the United States’ obligations under the international agreements made
with” the host states.170 Justice Black, writing for a plurality, replied that “no
agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any
other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution . . . . The prohibitions of the Constitution . . . cannot be nullified
by the Executive or by the Executive and the Senate combined,” 171 thus
implying that the same result would be forthcoming under an Article II treaty
as opposed to the executive agreements at issue in Reid.172 The Reid plurality
also carefully distinguished Holland, in which, Black stressed, “[T]he treaty
involved was not inconsistent with any specific provision of the Constitution.

the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1187-88 (2000); Lawson & Seidman, supra note 41, at 1516.
165. S. REP. NO. 412, at 1, amend. 2 (1953).
166. Jide Nzelibe, Partisan Conflicts Over Presidential Authority, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
389, 428 (2011). See generally DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A
TEST OF EISENHOWER’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988).
167. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
168. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
169. Id. at 3-4, 15-16; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; id. amends. V & VI.
170. Reid, 354 U.S. at 16.
171. Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added). Because Reid involved only sole executive agreements, its
reference to Article II treaties (“the Executive and Senate combined”) is dicta (in a plurality opinion); it
therefore did not and could not overrule Holland.
172. Id. at 5-6. Justice Harlan concurred on the narrow ground that the defendants were tried for
capital offenses. Id. at 65. But a majority of the Court found that distinction irrelevant three years later.
Kinsella v. U.S. ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 721 (1987); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 323-24
(1988).
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The Court was concerned with the Tenth Amendment which reserves to the
States or the people all power not delegated to the National Government.”173
Reid has long been understood, correctly, to allay fears that Holland
implies that treaties can supersede clear constitutional constraints. In 1987, the
American Law Institute did not hesitate to codify in the new Restatement that
“[n]o provision of an agreement may contravene any of the prohibitions or
limitations of the Constitution applicable to the exercise of authority by the
United States.”174 The following year, the Supreme Court, citing Reid, struck
down on First Amendment grounds a provision of the D.C. Code prohibiting
the display of any sign, or the congregation of three or more persons, within
500 feet of a foreign embassy, if the display or congregation tended to bring
that foreign government into public “odium” or “disrepute.”175 The Court so
held even though, first, Congress enacted it pursuant to its power to “define and
punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations,”176 and, second, the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the United States is a party and
which “represents the current state of international law,” requires states “to take
all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion
or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or
impairment of its dignity.”177
By the late twentieth century, it therefore seemed clear that Holland did
not affect constitutional provisions apart from arguable Tenth Amendment
limits. But the vitality of the Tenth Amendment as a check on the treaty power
remained unclear. The Supreme Court continued to cite Holland in cases in
which the Tenth Amendment might otherwise have presented a fatal barrier.178
In fact, as of 2006, the Court’s Justices had cited Holland in thirty-four
opinions, none of which overturned it.179 Lower courts too have applied and
cited Holland as good law.180
Yet for most intents and purposes, Holland scarcely mattered for decades.
Roughly between the Bricker Amendment’s defeat in 1953 and the resurgence
of states’ rights jurisprudence in the 1980s, the Court’s broad reading of the
Commerce Clause enabled Congress to regulate virtually any activity, however
attenuated its connection to federal interests. Canonical cases like Wickard v.
Filburn,181 Katzenbach v. McClung,182 and other post-New Deal and Civil
173. Reid, 354 U.S. at 18.
174. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 302(2) & cmt. b (1987).
175. Boos, 485 U.S. at 315 (quoting D.C. CODE § 22-1115 (1987)). But see Lawson &
Seidman, supra note 41, at 6, 16-18 (arguing that the First Amendment does not apply to the treaty
power).
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see Boos, 485 U.S. at 316.
177. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 22, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500
U.N.T.S. 95.
178. E.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201, 225 (2004); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band
of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204 (1999).
179. See Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the
Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1353 (2006).
180. E.g., United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 82-85 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Belfast, 611
F.3d 783, 805-06 (11th Cir. 2010); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Lucci, 222 A.2d 522, 527 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1966); see also Martin v. State, 24 Ill. Ct. Cl. 6, 10 (1960).
181. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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Rights era cases expanded the scope of the Commerce Clause to all but
eliminate constraints on Congress’s power to regulate issues that once might
have been deemed clearly reserved to the states. To be sure, as late as 1976, in
National League of Cities v. Usery,183 the Supreme Court, 5-4, said that the
Tenth Amendment protects certain traditional or integral state functions from
federal regulation (although it did not identify them). But a decade later, in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, a similarly divided
Court overturned National League, concluding that the distinction between
traditional and non-traditional state functions could not be sustained “for
purposes of state immunity under the Commerce Clause.”184 It “reject[ed], as
unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from
federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular
governmental function is ‘integral’ or ‘traditional.’”185
The Court thus embraced the idea that limits on federal power reside
solely in the political safeguards of federalism,186 that is, structural features of
the Constitution that “protect the States from overreaching by Congress,” for
example, by giving the states prominent “role[s] in the selection both of the
Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government.”187 For as
long as this view prevailed, Holland’s merits seemed mostly academic.
Jurisprudential developments since 1920 would have rendered it unnecessary
for the federal government to protect migratory birds that routinely cross
international and state borders by concluding a treaty. The Commerce Clause
would have sufficed. No longer, in other words, did it seem “obvious” that
there were “matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an
act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act
could.”188
But the jurisprudential tide shifted under Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
leadership as the Court breathed new life into federalism. Among other
developments reinvigorating federalism, the Rehnquist Court invalidated
federal laws commandeering state legislatures and executive officials; 189
expanded the scope of the Eleventh Amendment to confer upon the states
immunity from suit in most cases;190 and for the first time since the New Deal,
struck down federal laws as beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause.191
Furthermore, although the Court has not overruled Garcia explicitly, it has

182. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
183. 426 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1976).
184. 469 U.S. 528, 530 (1985).
185. Id. at 546-47.
186. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). The
Supreme Court has expressly adopted this view in several cases. E.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120.
187. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551.
188. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
189. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992)
190. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996).
191. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
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decided several cases that seem to be in considerable tension with Garcia’s
rejection of the idea of traditional state functions. 192 Holland’s potential
implications therefore began to resurface insofar as they might enable the
federal government to accomplish by treaty what is now foreclosed by the
Tenth Amendment. This prospect has long been among the chief critiques of
Holland,193 and it has reemerged because of developments in both national and
international law.
B. The Political and Legal Limits of Holland
1. Political Constraints: A Short, Not-So-Horrible Parade
Before considering Bond’s future consequences more closely, it is
prudent to put into some perspective a red herring that persists despite a century
of experience with Holland: the parade of horribles that Holland supposedly set
to march. Critics of Holland have long constructed a variety of implausible
hypothetical scenarios. Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Bond is a recent
exemplar:
[T]he possibilities of what the Federal Government may accomplish, with the right
treaty in hand, are endless and hardly farfetched. . . . For example, the holding that a
statute prohibiting the carrying of firearms near schools went beyond Congress’s
enumerated powers, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 512 (1995), could be
reversed by negotiating a treaty with Latvia providing that neither sovereign would
194
permit the carrying of guns near schools.

Similarly, Justice Scalia suggested, the United States could bar “state
inheritance taxes on real property” to implement a treaty. Among other jurists
over the years, he concluded based on such speculation that “Holland places
Congress only one treaty away from acquiring a general police power.”195
Hypotheticals of this sort have been bandied about since the Court
decided Holland. Any competent law professor can construct countless others.
Senator Bricker and his colleagues took them seriously, and Justice Scalia’s
concurrence shows that this worry persists. Yet it is both fair and accurate to
describe such hypotheticals as farfetched. Holland has been good law for
almost a century. No one can point to a single real example of abuse. In the
ninety-four years since Holland—through World War II, global economic
integration, massive immigration flows, the modern conflict with transnational
terrorism, and all the familiar dislocations that beset the modern world—the
federal government has never, never, sought to evade a Supreme Court decision
or otherwise circumvent the Constitution by concluding a contrived treaty with
a foreign nation. It is not difficult to see why.
First, whatever the general force of the political safeguards of federalism,

192. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). See generally John C. Yoo,
The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997).
193. E.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2100 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2101.
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they prove manifestly effective in the treaty realm. 196 The Constitution
deliberately makes it difficult to conclude treaties. Under Article II, the
President may ratify a treaty only with the concurrence of two-thirds of the
Senate.197 Securing that concurrence is no simple matter—and it shows.198
Consider a few examples: the United States has refused to ratify, among other
treaties, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,199 which
essentially codified U.S. law internationally;200 the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, which only the United States has not ratified; 201 and the
Convention on the Law of the Sea, despite a widespread belief that it would
further the national interest.202
Second, constituents hold senators accountable. Except perhaps in
(historically unprecedented) exigent circumstances, senators would be highly
unlikely to agree to an ersatz treaty crafted by the executive branch simply to
override state authority or “overrule” a disfavored Supreme Court decision. As
Professor Epps observed, commenting on Justice Scalia’s hypothetical treaty
with Latvia, “67 senators or so (depending on the number voting), after a public
debate, would have to agree that Latvian-U.S. relations should govern guns in
American high schools,” and because the Constitution guarantees all states two
senators regardless of their populations, “[e]ven in a harmonious Senate,
senators representing roughly 7.5 percent of the population could block a gun
treaty.”203
Third, it is unclear why the federal government would have an interest in
arrogating to itself power over traditional state functions like probate. It is no
accident that it has never sought to conclude a treaty for the purpose of taking
over a traditional state police power. To the contrary, it has become
commonplace for the federal government to insert federalism clauses in
international agreements in order to protect the states from intrusion upon their

196. Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to be a Nation? Federal Power vs. “States’ Rights” in Foreign
Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277, 1308-09 (1999); Wechsler, supra note 186.
197. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
198. See, e.g., GLEN S. KRUTZ & JEFFREY S. PEAKE, TREATY POLITICS AND THE RISE OF
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 32-35 (2009).
199. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3.
President Bush signed the Convention, but despite former Senator Dole’s memorable appearance in a
wheelchair to encourage Senate approval, the treaty did not even make it out of committee. Michael
Kranish, The Story of Washington Gridlock Seen Through the Eyes of Bob Dole, BOSTON GLOBE (Mar.
24, 2013), http://www.boston.com/news/politics/2013/03/23/the-story-washington-gridlock-seen
-through-the-eyes-bob-dole/zyQ05CKoGMKjPBDcNJGAVP/story.html.
200. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of C. Boyden Gray), http://www.foreign.senate.gov
/imo/media/doc/Gray_Testimony.pdf.
201. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. Federalism is one
reason the United States has not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Some fear
that the CRC will interfere with family matters traditionally reserved to the states. See Why Won’t
America Ratify the UN Convention on Children’s Rights?, ECONOMIST (Oct. 6, 2013), http://www
.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/10/economist-explains-2.
202. See, e.g., Thomas Wright, Outlaw of the Sea, FOREIGN AFF. (Aug. 7, 2012), https://www
.foreignaffairs.com/articles/oceans/2012-08-07/outlaw-sea.
203. Garrett Epps, Bond v. U.S. Doesn’t Mean Latvian Cops Are Coming for Your Guns, THE
ATLANTIC (June 5, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/06/bond-v-us-doesnt-mean
-that-latvian-cops-are-coming-for-your-guns/372263/.
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traditional powers.204 Senators often insist upon these provisions as a condition
of their consent, often because the states carry out their functions ably, and
Senators see no need to fix what does not need fixing.
Finally, of course, treaties require two parties: the United Kingdom and
the United States had a mutual interest in cooperating to preserve migratory
birds that traversed international, not just state, borders. Absent a similar
mutual interest, it would require a good measure of (passing strange) collusion
for Latvia, or any foreign nation, to enter into a contrived treaty with the United
States to enable the federal government to keep guns out of school zones—or,
in general, to expand federal power at the expense of the states.205 And it is a
virtual certainty that any such contrivance would become evident long before
the treaty received the consideration, still less approval, of the Senate.
In sum, “Holland places Congress only one treaty away from acquiring a
general police power”206 only in an imaginary world—not the one in which we
live.
2. Legal Constraints: The Scope of Holland
The lessons of practice, experience, and history notwithstanding, some
critics object to Holland’s supposed theoretical scope: did the Framers really
vest the federal government with the potential power to vitiate the Tenth
Amendment altogether, subject to finding the right treaty partner? How could
that be consistent with the foundational principle that the Constitution
establishes a federal government with delegated powers only, all residual
authority remaining with the states? Tellingly, Holmes did not offer a general
theory of the scope and limits of the treaty power. Holland did not require it.
Extensive dicta on such a critical constitutional issue would have been, literally
and figuratively, injudicious. We cannot and should not, therefore, try to draw
any firm conclusions about Holmes’s view of issues beyond those he
addressed. Indeed, far from offering needless, imprudent speculation in
Holland, the dicta in Holmes’s brief opinion served only to reinforce the
limited scope of his decision. Properly understood, Holmes’s analysis does not
conflict with the principle that the Constitution established a federal
government of delegated, limited powers.
Holmes predicated his analysis in Holland on an Article II treaty.207 The
204. See Hollis, supra note 179, at 1373-75. The federalism clause in the International Labor
Organization’s Constitution encouraged federal states, such as the United States, Australia, and Canada,
to seek similar clauses in other international agreements. The United States inserted federal-state clauses
in the 1967 Protocol to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Cybercrime
Convention. Id. at 1375-76; see also David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical
Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1273 (2000).
205. “The United States and Latvia have not in fact negotiated such a treaty. Why not? Could it
be that countries do not enter into treaties that regulate internal matters because they have no reason to
do so?” Bond v. United States, ERIC POSNER (June 2, 2014), http://ericposner.com/bond-v-united-states.
Posner is likely correct that the “unstated target of the [concurrence] is the international human rights
treaty.” Id. The ghost of Senator Bricker lives on. Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights
Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341 (1995).
206. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2101 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
207. Because Holland’s doctrine is limited to Article II treaties, the federalism issue it raises
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decision’s logic is properly limited to that context. Holmes presupposed that
Article II establishes a federal lawmaking power in the President and Senate
that is conceptually and in its scope distinct from that of Congress under Article
I. That is why, Holmes argued, an act of Congress to implement an Article II
treaty may sometimes accomplish what an act of Congress under Article I,
Section 8, alone, may not. Beyond doubts in some scholarly quarters about the
constitutionality of other types of U.S. international agreements, 208 it is
therefore clear that neither congressional-executive nor sole executive
agreements suffice under Holland. Henkin aptly summarized Holmes’s logic in
this regard:
What he said, simply, was that the Constitution delegated powers to various
branches of the federal government, not only to Congress; the Treaty Power was
delegated to the federal treaty-makers, a delegation additional to and independent of
the delegations to Congress. Since the Treaty Power was delegated to the federal
government, whatever is within its scope is not reserved to the states: the Tenth
Amendment is not material. Many matters, then, may appear to be ‘reserved to the
States’ as regards domestic legislation if Congress does not have power to regulate
them; but they are not reserved to the states so as to exclude their regulation by
209
international agreement.

In other words, certain matters fall within the domain of the treaty power, and
hence the federal government, even though they do not fall within the domain
of congressional power.
Henkin’s insight posits two additional legal limits on Holland’s doctrinal
scope. First, Holland “did not say that there were no limitations on the Treaty
Power in favor of the states, only that there were none in any ‘invisible
radiation’ from the Tenth Amendment.”210 The phrase “invisible radiation” is a
rhetorical flourish, but Holmes’s essential point is clear. The general terms of
the Tenth Amendment (reserving to the states or the people what the
Constitution does not delegate to the federal government) do not establish a
nebulous penumbra of state authority that limits the treaty power. Scholars have
argued, however, that specific federalism constraints exist, for example, that the
federal government may not, by treaty, cede state territory to a foreign nation
without that state’s consent, deny to any state a republican form of government,
or abolish state militias.211 We take no position on these issues here, except to
say that we see no basis for the limitation suggested by Justice Thomas in
Bond, and by Hughes and others before him, namely, the supposed distinction
between “proper” international and (qualitatively distinct) domestic issues.212
Second, Holland’s doctrine is limited to the structural allocation of power
will almost always arise in the context of what Hughes, Jefferson, and others have described as
“genuine” or “proper” international treaties. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 41, at 14; cf. Bond, 134 S.
Ct. at 2110 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). The principal exception is the international human
rights treaty, which does not conform to the contractual model dominant in earlier centuries. Cf. Henkin,
Ghost of Senator Bricker, supra note 205.
208. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on FreeForm Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995).
209. HENKIN, supra note 24, at 191.
210. Id. at 193.
211. See HENKIN, supra note 24, at 193 & nn.72-75. Nor, almost surely, could a treaty deprive
a state of its voice in the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
212. 134 S. Ct. at 2110 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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between the federal and state governments. “Many matters,” Henkin wrote,
“may appear to be ‘reserved to the States’ as regards domestic legislation if
Congress does not have power to regulate them; but they are not reserved to the
states so as to exclude their regulation by international agreement.”213 Justice
Holmes interpreted the Treaty Clause relative to the Tenth Amendment, not any
other provision of the Constitution. In particular, he neither said nor implied
anything about the Bill of Rights. As the Court has since held, no treaty may
infringe individual rights, such as the right to grand jury indictment, jury trial,
and freedom of expression. Note, therefore, that after District of Columbia v.
Heller,214 not only would a hypothetical gun treaty with Latvia, as a political
matter, stand no chance of being concluded, it would also, as a legal matter, be
presumptively unconstitutional under Reid insofar as it infringed upon the right
to possess a handgun for lawful purposes as affirmed in Heller.
It may be objected, as it has been, that there is no principled basis upon
which to limit Holland to the Tenth Amendment alone, insulating the rights of
individuals, but not states, from the doctrine’s ambit. Not so. Holland speaks to
a structural issue raised by the Tenth Amendment about the allocation of
federal and state authority. It does not increase the aggregate power of
government within the United States (state and federal) at the expense of the
governed. In other words, Holland holds that treaties may adjust which
government has authority to exercise a particular power.215 But nowhere does
Holmes suggest that treaties confer on government, state or federal, any power
that the Constitution otherwise denies to government in the aggregate.
Consider Holland itself: it established that to the extent necessary to carry
out treaty obligations to the United Kingdom, federal rather than state
government had the power to regulate migratory birds. Absent the 1916 treaty,
the same power existed; it is just that the power would have remained with the
states rather than the federal government. No one argued (it would have been
absurd) that the Constitution protects the people from governmental regulation
of migratory birds—as it protects the people from, for example, deprivation of
liberty without due process of law. Nor did Justice Holmes suggest that the
1916 treaty gave government, state and federal, any power it would otherwise
lack under the Constitution. In Bond, similarly, Bond challenged the federal
government’s right to make it a crime to prosecute her for a “purely local”
assault with a chemical weapon.216 She did not dispute that Pennsylvania, the
213. HENKIN, supra note 24, at 191.
214. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
215. From an originalist perspective, this limitation on Holland’s doctrine makes sense. The
Tenth Amendment deals with an issue of structure and the allocation of authority. The reasonable person
of 1789 surely understood that one of the virtues of the new Constitution would be its amelioration of
the problems created by state refusal under the Articles of Confederation to abide by national treaty
obligations. Because international law, today as in 1789, regards nations, not their political subdivisions,
as the repository of state responsibility, see Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session
art. 4, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 at 44, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), violation of, for example,
the Jay Treaty, would have placed the nation as a whole at risk, potentially the risk of war, in 1789, see
THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 102 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Enabling treaties to
ameliorate this risk by empowering the federal government, under a treaty, to exert greater authority
relative to the states than usual would be a logical response to this risk.
216. Bond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2077, 2087-88 (2014).
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relevant state government, had the power to make precisely the same conduct a
crime and to prosecute her under its laws. The Court agreed: “It is . . . clear that
the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (and every other State) are
sufficient to prosecute Bond. Pennsylvania has several statutes that would
likely cover her assault. . . . And state authorities regularly enforce these laws
in poisoning cases.”217 All this is to reaffirm from another perspective the
abiding truth of Justice Black’s reassurance in Reid v. Covert.218
Finally, Holland may not have proclaimed as broad a doctrine as some of
its critics suppose. To see why, reconsider two passages from the opinion. First,
early in the analysis, Holmes wrote:
We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making
power; but they must be ascertained in a different way. It is obvious that there may
be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of
Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could, and it
is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, ‘a power
which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government’ is not
to be found. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1902). What was said in that case
with regard to the powers of the States applies with equal force to the powers of the
219
nation in cases where the States individually are incompetent to act.

Later, he concluded:
Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be
protected only by national action in concert with that of another power. . . . It is not
sufficient to rely upon the States. The reliance is vain, and were it otherwise, the
220
question is whether the United States is forbidden to act.

These passages may suggest a narrower legal doctrine, which, quite apart
from the political safeguards of federalism, does not necessarily place
traditional state powers at the mere whim of the federal government. Holmes
began with the “general question” of the test of the treaty power’s scope in the
face of a claimed Tenth Amendment “exemption.” He rejected the argument
that the Tenth Amendment, as such, creates an omnibus exemption. Article II,
he observed, delegates the treaty power to the federal government, and hence,
“whatever is within its scope is not reserved to the states: the Tenth
Amendment is not material.”221 That observation need not, and presumably
does not, mean that just anything is “within its scope”; if anything, it implies
the contrary. Holmes said only that the limits of the treaty power “must be
ascertained in a different way.” 222 But with reference to the rationale of
Andrews and Holland’s language, that way may depend on the ability of the
United States to vindicate national interests in circumstances where, first,
effective regulation necessitates “national action in concert with that of another
power”; and, second, either the states would be “incompetent to act” or reliance
upon them would be “vain”—a more circumscribed conception of Holland’s
doctrinal reach.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 2092.
354 U.S. 1, 3, 16 (1957).
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1902).
Id. at 435.
HENKIN, supra note 24, at 191 (emphasis added).
Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
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Holmes, again, took a pragmatic view of constitutional adjudication. He
saw “nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government” to stay its hand
despite the manifest inability of the states to handle a pressing national issue.223
The Constitution establishes a functional and durable government for the whole
nation. It should not be interpreted to deprive government in the aggregate,
state and federal, of the ability to act effectively to address a critical national
need. In Andrews, as we saw above, Justice White confronted a situation in
which the interaction of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and a Massachusetts
state law might yield the conclusion that neither federal nor state government
could effectively regulate a vital legal issue—the institution of marriage, as it
was understood at the time. Holmes therefore quoted Andrews for the
proposition that “it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring
national action, ‘a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every
civilized government’ is not to be found . . . . What was said in that case with
regard to the powers of the States applies with equal force to the powers of the
nation in cases where the States individually are incompetent to act.”224
Both Andrews and Holland thus resolved perceived conflicts between
state and federal power internal to the Constitution. We need not, in other
words, read the passages in these cases about “civilized government” and the
like to refer to extraconstitutional conceptions of law inherent in sovereignty or
nationhood.225 Nor should we. It is well-known that Holmes disdained such
metaphysical or transcendental conceptions of natural law.226
Because the Constitution establishes a government intended to endure and

223. Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
224. Id. at 433.
225. It would be mistaken to read Holland to endorse any doctrine comparable to Justice
Sutherland’s notoriously flawed theory in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936), especially insofar as it suggests plenary presidential power in foreign affairs. We have both
critiqued Curtiss-Wright elsewhere. Michael J. Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs
Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright? 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 5 (1988); Robert D. Sloane, Is CurtissWright’s Characterization of Executive Power Correct?: The Puzzling Persistence of Curtiss-Wright
Based Theories of Executive Power, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5072 (2011). And the Supreme Court
recently rejected the broad reading of Curtiss-Wright long advocated by the executive branch.
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). The most plausible, which is not to say persuasive,
argument in favor of presidentialism today is a functional claim about the national security needs of the
nation since World War II. Functionalism takes two different forms, however, only one of which we
attribute to Holmes. The first is a claim that, in the event of ambiguity, the Constitution should be
construed in a manner that allows it to work—to create a competent government that integrates, rather
than contravenes, the structural values that animate the instrument as a whole. Among those values,
institutional pluralism is preeminent. That functionalist claim, however, is quite distinct from the kind of
functionalist argument that Sutherland advanced for extraconstitutional presidential power beyond what
Article II spells out. As Justice Brandeis reminded us, “[t]he doctrine of the separation of powers was
adopted by the convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the
distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.”
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926). There is nothing functional in this regard about
sweeping presidential power; to the contrary, it is dysfunctional from a U.S. constitutional perspective: it
institutionalizes the executive role by deinstitutionalizing the roles of the legislature and courts.
Valorization of the president’s potential capacities and resources in foreign affairs may be factually true
(e.g., he has greater access to information, the ability to respond more quickly and decisively than
Congress, and so forth). But the Framers deliberately rejected this vision of functionalism and
efficiency, and the Constitution should not be interpreted to the contrary.
226. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1918); cf. Southern Pac.
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917).
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function for ages to come, it would be dysfunctional for the Constitution—
hence “not lightly to be assumed”—to disable the federalist system it
establishes from enabling government, state or federal as the case may be, from
meeting real though unforeseen, and perhaps unforeseeable, challenges.
Holland, read in light of Andrews, construed the treaty power to extend to
situations where the nation seeks to vindicate an interest of “very nearly the
first magnitude”; reliance upon the states would be in vain; and action in
concert with another country would empower government to address the issue
effectively. There is no reason to construe the Constitution to disallow
Holland’s reading of the treaty power based on an “invisible radiation from the
general terms of the Tenth Amendment.”227
Holland’s doctrine therefore does not, as a matter of law, risk the kind of
expansion of federal power at the expense of the states that worries its critics.
Andrews and Holland alike imply legal, as well as political, limits on the
latter’s doctrine. Justice Black’s opinion in Reid suggests the same, for its
consistency with Holland rests on Black’s statement that Holland had not been
concerned with “any specific provision of the Constitution,” only the scope of
the Tenth Amendment.228
V. HOLLAND AND THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES
A. After Bond: The Treaty Power and Federalism in Contemporary
Perspective
Scholars have, as noted, criticized Holland on historical, structural,
textual, and other grounds.229 Many of these critiques can be, and have been,
answered on their own terms, 230 persuasively or not, and it would be
superfluous to rehearse them. Yet the scholarly debate over Holland has taken
place largely within the confines of constitutional methodologies that Justice
Holmes would have rejected. Consequently, they tend to miss the force of
Holland’s abiding functionalist, adaptivist rationale.
Holmes was a pragmatist. 231 His methodology of constitutional
adjudication reflected it,232 as, of course, did Holland. The decision relied, as
Holmes candidly wrote, on a vision of the Constitution as an organic document
that has adapted, as it should, to evolving national conditions in the light of
history, practice, and experience. Constitutional adjudication should preserve
and contribute to the strong foundation established by the Constitution for the
United States as “a nation.”233 Holmes did not believe the Tenth Amendment
227. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
228. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957).
229. See, e.g., Lawson & Seidman, supra note 41; Michael D. Ramsey, Missouri v. Holland
and Historical Textualism, 72 MO. L. REV. 969 (2008); Rosenkranz, supra note 7.
230. See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, Putting Missouri v. Holland on the Map, 73 MO. L. REV
1007 (2008); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Missouri v. Holland’s Second Holding, 73 MO. L. REV. 939
(2008).
231. See LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 432-33 (2002).
232. See RICHARD POSNER, Introduction, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, at xi (Richard Posner ed.,
1992).
233. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (emphasis added).
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froze in time a static set of rights reserved to thirteen agrarian states in a
precarious seaboard republic of 3.5 million people.234
Echoing Chief Justice Marshall, he wrote of the Constitution as a
foundational but organic document, constitutive of a nation, and “intended to
endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises
of human affairs.”235 The Constitution therefore does not establish a set of
“immutable rules,” which could disable the nation’s government from
responding to future “exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen
dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.”236 To the contrary,
like Justice White in Andrews, Justice Holmes sought to interpret the
Constitution to work—to function as durable, foundational law for the system
of government it establishes, including, but not limited to, the federal structure
of the United States. Holland interpreted the Article II treaty power to enable a
functional, but interstitial, adjustment of the allocation of authority between the
states and the federal government, which the Constitution, respectively,
presupposed and established.
One may, of course, reject Holmes’s jurisprudential approach. By
describing it, we do not blithely dismiss critiques of Holland that sound in other
approaches to constitutional adjudication. We do, however, consider it
appropriate to assess Holland on its own terms. Assuming, as Holmes did, that
the Constitution is a document “intended to endure for ages to come”237—that it
must adapt to “exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly,
and which can be best provided for as they occur”238 —what might be the
consequences for the nation of abandoning Holland? If Bond effectively
eviscerated Holland, as we have argued, what effects might we expect in the
future?
Despite Holland’s periodic citation by the courts,239 its real-world effects
to date, as noted earlier, have been modest. In part, the reason for this is
historical and traces to the post-New Deal expansion of congressional power.
But the reason is also diplomatic, reflecting the federal government’s
reluctance to conclude treaties that intrude on traditional state functions. When
it has concluded such treaties, it has often included federalism clauses or
textual reservations intended to reassure the states or protect traditional state
authority.240 If the federal government’s practices in this regard continue, the
issue in Holland may not arise frequently.
B. What the Future Holds
Yet Holland’s limited influence in the past may be an unreliable
barometer of its impact in the future. Today, more than ever before, the nation’s
234. Id. at 434.
235. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the
Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1353-54 (2006).
240. See id. at 1361-62, 1372-75.
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needs often require state deference to federal foreign-affairs interests. If this
historical trajectory continues, Bond’s effects may begin to look both serious
and unwelcome. 241 The federal government had substantial reasons for
submitting a brief that implored the Court not to overrule Holland.242 Whether
Holland remains good law might “alter U.S. positions in international
negotiations.”243 Why is that a problem? The federal government, as noted, has
long sought, often successfully, to accommodate state concerns and interests in
the course of treaty negotiations; and the political safeguards of federalism all
but guarantee that the government’s practices in this regard will persist.
Furthermore, if, as we suggested earlier, the most common concerns have been
overstated, and if, as we also noted earlier, the effect of Holland has thus far
been marginal, why might the Holland doctrine nonetheless prove to be of
more than academic interest? The answer revolves around postwar changes in
international law, in particular, the modern law of treaties, which constitute the
predominant source of international law today, in contrast to custom’s
predominance in the past.244
C. The Postwar Evolution of Treaty Law
It is a truism that international law now governs far more than relations
between nations. What some scholars call transnational law includes issues of
trade, foreign investment, war, international crime, national security,
international organizations, jurisdiction, global commons, human rights, and
international administrative law. It also subsumes the full spectrum of
international dispute resolution: the International Court of Justice; WTO
panels; the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; private international
arbitral tribunals for commercial, investment, and other disputes; ad hoc,
hybrid, and permanent international criminal courts; and diverse committees
and quasi-judicial bodies established by treaty. The United States participates
in all these areas of international law. As the world’s largest economic and
military power, it has an especially strong interest in its ability to shape and
sustain them.
Today, however, the principal source of international law is no longer
custom but treaties, often multilateral treaties. Some treaties, such as the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea,245 comprehensively regulate fields that
were once governed by custom. The law of treaties has also evolved
substantially since 1789, as reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
241. Cf. John C. Yoo, Globalization and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and
the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1956-58 (1999) (observing that modern treaties
permeate virtually every aspect of international law, with growing effects on domestic law, including in
the realms of environmental, trade, and human rights).
242. Brief for Respondent at 47-55, Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (No. 12158).
243. See INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 256 (Jeffrey Dunoff et al. eds., 3d
ed. 2010).
244. Yoo, supra note 241, at 1956-57; see also Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still
Matters—Non-State Actors, Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 137 (2005).
245. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 183 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
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Treaties.246 Many contemporary treaties differ from the contractual paradigm
of the nineteenth century.247 Some multilateral treaties, chiefly international
human rights treaties, also govern how a nation treats its own citizens or other
traditionally domestic matters.
The idea that only properly international issues may be the subject of
treaties—as Charles Evans Hughes, Thomas Jefferson, and others once
suggested—is anachronistic. It assumes an unrealistic (and often arbitrary)
brightline distinction between domestic and international issues. 248 Most
treaties still do not intrude upon “purely local” issues within the realm of
traditional state functions. But some do—and as in 1789, reliance on the states
to carry out, or uniformly interpret, national treaty obligations may sometimes
be in vain. Modern multilateral treaties that deal with matters such as trade,
investment, the environment, and international organizations, among other
issues, may entail obligations that involve, which need not mean intrude upon,
traditional state functions.
With more and more issues requiring international cooperation—for
example, global warming—the need to avoid brightline subject-matter
limitations on treaties is more pressing than ever. Absent Holland’s sensible
doctrine, the limitations imposed by the Tenth Amendment would risk
undermining confidence in the United States as a treaty partner, as the United
States emphasized in its brief in Bond.249 The United States can sometimes
accommodate or allay the concerns of potential treaty partners by crafting
federalism clauses or including reservations—but not always. Reservations
may be at odds with the object and purpose of the treaty. This might be true, for
example, of a treaty requiring intrastate environmental regulations. Yet even
before Bond, the Court suggested that federal regulation of an intrastate body of
water might well be in violation of the Tenth Amendment. 250 Other
reservations might be excluded by the terms of the treaty, as they are, for

246. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
247. See, e.g., United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U.S. 427, 467 (1893); Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 21 (1821). The International
Court of Justice’s (ICJ) Reservations to the Genocide Convention advisory opinion notably led
international lawyers to replace the traditional principle of unanimity, requiring each party to agree
precisely on the treaty’s terms, with a less contractual, more flexible model, authorizing reservations
subject to a modest limitation based on the object and purpose of the treaty. Reservations to Convention
on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 24 (May 28).
248. But see Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2110 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (suggesting that “hypothetical difficulties in line-drawing are no reason to ignore a
constitutional limit on federal power”).
249. Brief for Respondent at 47-55, Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (No. 12158). One example of a post-Lopez situation in which Holland influenced treaty negotiations is U.S.
opposition to the draft Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS,
ACTORS, PROCESS, supra note 243, at 256. The treaty “would have prohibited the distribution of free
tobacco samples to children, because the federal government allegedly lacked authority to regulate the
samples under the Commerce Clause,” culminating in the treaty’s revision to the softer language
“prohibit or promote the prohibition.” Yet if the United States were to ratify the treaty (it has signed but
not ratified), and if Holland no longer remains good law, it is still unclear whether it would be
constitutional for the federal government to require the states to take action under the treaty as opposed,
for example, to merely exhorting them to act. See id.; cf. Peter Spiro, Resurrecting Missouri v. Holland,
73 MO. L. REV. 1029, 1040 (2008); Vazquez, supra note 230, at 965 (2008).
250. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S.
159 (2001).
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example, by the Convention on the Law of the Sea.251
These changes reinforce the need to preserve Holland’s doctrine. It alone
enables the Treaty Clause to deal flexibly with powers and rights that might
otherwise be deemed integral state functions and hence immune from, even
vital, national regulation. On balance, then, we suggest that it would have been
at least valuable, and may well turn out to be critical, to preserve Holland. The
United States must remain able to adapt to an era in which most international
law is based on treaties and in which participation in the international legal
system will at times require flexibility in the allocation of federal and state
power. Flexibility is imperative in the practice of diplomacy no less than in the
Court’s own case law concerning diplomacy. Indeed, one consequence of
abandoning Holland is evident in its effect on one of the most significant
Supreme Court decisions on U.S. treaty law in decades, Medellín v. Texas.252
Bond has rendered it all but incoherent.
D. Medellín’s New Incoherence
Beginning with the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) decision in
Breard 253 and, as a consequence, the Court’s brief opinion in Breard v.
Greene,254 the ICJ decided a trio of cases under the Optional Protocol to the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Optional Protocol). 255 In each,
states had convicted and sentenced foreign nationals to death following their
convictions in trials in which the defendants were denied the right to consular
assistance under Article 38 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(VCCR).256 The United States is a party to the VCCR, and Article 38 is selfexecuting in that it imposes obligations on the United States, including all
relevant federal and state officials who act on the nation’s behalf, without the
need for implementing legislation. 257 Article 38 is, under the Supremacy
Clause, the “Law of the Land.”258 In Avena, the last of the ICJ cases, the ICJ
held that the United States was under an obligation to allow some fifty Mexican
nationals on death row in various states, all of whom had been denied their
Article 38 right to consular assistance under the VCCR, to have their
convictions and sentences reviewed and reconsidered.259 The ICJ also held that
the requirement of review and reconsideration should be carried out by the

251. UNCLOS, supra note 245, arts. 309-10.
252. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
253. Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 37 I.L.M.
810 (1998).
254. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
255. The other two are LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9, Order (Mar. 3), and Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). These cases led to
numerous decisions in both state and federal U.S. courts, including, in addition to Breard, Medellín v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006), and Federal Republic of
Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999).
256. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 38, Apr. 24, 1963, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500
U.N.T.S. 95.
257. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 505.
258. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
259. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. ¶¶ 57, 105.
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judiciary.260
After Avena, President George W. Bush withdrew from the Optional
Protocol,261 which had supplied the ICJ with the jurisdiction to decide the
VCCR disputes.262 But under the U.N. Charter, “[e]ach Member of the United
Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of
Justice in any case to which it is a party.”263 As a matter of international law,
the United States therefore remained under a treaty obligation to comply with
the ICJ’s final judgment in Avena,264 which the Court rendered before U.S.
withdrawal from the Optional Protocol. President Bush accordingly issued a
statement indicating that he had determined that in order to give effect to the
ICJ’s decision, state courts that had sentenced the Mexican nationals named in
Avena should give effect to the ICJ requirement of review and reconsideration
by applying general principles of comity.265 Many states refused, even though
every state official (governors, state court judges, attorney generals, line
prosecutors, and so forth) is part of, and acts on behalf of, the United States as a
nation—the legal entity to which the ICJ properly directed its judgment under
international law.266
Most states either did not recognize the international obligation as legally
binding or simply refused to abide by it,267 conduct that cannot fail to call to
mind the problems experienced by the nation under the Articles of
Confederation. But apart from President Bush’s unilateral directive, the federal
government, too, failed to take action to respect the international obligation
imposed by Avena (in combination with the VCCR, the Optional Protocol, and
the U.N. Charter): Congress did not try to enact legislation authorizing
compliance; the U.S. Attorney General did not bring suit to compel
enforcement of the international obligation against recalcitrant state officials;
and both federal and state judicial officers, by and large, gave the ICJ’s
judgment, at best, the “respectful consideration” that the Supreme Court had
suggested in its brief per curiam opinion from 1998 denying Breard’s
application for a stay of execution based on a prior provisional order of the

260. Id. ¶ 122.
261. Steve Charnovitz, Correcting American’s Continuing Failure to Comply with the Avena
Judgment, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 572, 573, 579 (2012).
262. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, art. 1, opened for signature Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261.
263. U.N. CHARTER art. 94(1).
264. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008).
265. Charnovitz, supra note 261, at 573.
266. Before LaGrand, the ICJ had never held clearly that provisional measures were binding.
State (and federal) officials therefore arguably had the discretion to decline to abide by them. But in
LaGrand, the ICJ held that provisional measures are binding, LaGrand, (Ger. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9, ¶
29 (Mar. 3), and so in Avena, both the Court’s provisional measures and the final judgment it rendered
bound the United States, including everyone who acts for the United States under U.S. law. Cf. Louis
Henkin, Provisional Measures, U.S. Treaty Obligations, and the States, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 679, 680
(1998).
267. See Robert D. Sloane, Measures Necessary to Ensure: The ICJ’s Provisional Measures
Order in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 673, 688 (2004); Letter from
Advocates for Human Rights et al., on the Implementation of the Avena Decision, to Attorney Gen., Eric
Holder and Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/375.pdf.
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ICJ.268
When these issues reached the Supreme Court, it too declined to see itself
as under a direct obligation to give judicial effect to the ICJ’s judgment, in part
because it found the U.N. Charter (the treaty that imposed the obligation on the
United States to undertake to comply with Avena) non-self-executing.269 It
further held that President Bush’s directive to the state courts to effectuate the
decision by reviewing the convictions and sentences in conformity with general
principles of comity exceeded his power: “The President has an array of
political and diplomatic means available to enforce international obligations,
but unilaterally converting a non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one
is not among them. The responsibility for transforming an international
obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to
Congress.”270 Nor, the Court held, did the President have power, in effect, to
rewrite state judicial standards—that is, rules of decision—to be applied to
pending (or any) criminal cases.271
Medellín is, in our view, problematic in many respects; what is relevant
here, however, is not its arguable doctrinal deficiencies but its conclusion that
responsibility for effectuating U.S. international obligations under Avena “falls
to Congress.”272 In particular, the Court held that the United States may give
“domestic effect to an international treaty obligation under the Constitution” in
two potential ways—but in either case, compliance “requires joint action by the
Executive and Legislative Branches: The Senate can ratify a self-executing
treaty made by the Executive, or, if the ratified treaty is not self-executing,
Congress can enact implementing legislation approved by the President.”273
This resolution seems plausible under Holland: Congress could exercise
its Necessary and Proper Clause powers to enact federal law to carry into effect
U.S. treaty obligations under the U.N. Charter (emanating from the final Avena
judgment), and the implementing legislation would bind the states even if,
absent treaty obligations, Congress would lack the power to require state courts
to review and reconsider the relevant capital convictions and sentences of
Mexican nationals. After Bond, however, this route to discharging the Avena
judgment’s obligations would be unconstitutional. After Bond, had the federal
government sought to effectuate the international obligation imposed by Article
94 of the U.N. Charter, which the Supreme Court found to be non-selfexecuting, 274 by passing implementing legislation, that law would have
violated the Tenth Amendment. As the Bond Court said, a treaty’s
implementing legislation, that is, “the statute—unlike the Convention—must be
read consistent with principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional
structure.” 275 It is difficult to imagine a state function more integral or

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998).
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 517-18 (2008).
Id. at 525-26.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 525-26.
Id. at 527 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
See id. at 508-10.
Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (2014).
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traditional than the general police power to define and punish “purely local”
crimes.276 The criminal law at issue in Bond, as the Court there insisted, would
ordinarily be of “the sort . . . regulated by the States.”277
The Mexican nationals within the ambit of Avena had likewise been
convicted and sentenced under “purely local” state criminal laws. As
horrendous as their capital crimes were, none of them fell within the scope of
the federal government’s power under Article I, Section 8—or any other
delegated federal power. Absent the interpretation given to the Treaty Clause’s
interaction with the Tenth Amendment in Holland, the federal government
lacks power to interfere with purely local criminal laws and their
administration. Congress has no power to compel state courts to review and
reconsider state criminal convictions and sentences under a retroactive
standard. The only way in which Congress could have carried out
acknowledged U.S. international obligations emanating from the treaties at
issue, as the Medellín Court held that it alone could do,278 would have been by
resorting to the Necessary and Proper Clause.279 In particular, it would have
needed to enact legislation necessary and proper to implement the international
obligation incurred by the United States based on the combination of four
treaties: the VCCR, the Optional Protocol, the Avena decision, and the U.N.
Charter.
Had Holland survived Bond, then the means by which the Medellín Court
suggested that the United States could discharge non-self-executing treaty
obligations would at least be intelligible. Congress would have the authority to
enact legislation to require the states to carry out U.S. international
obligations—notwithstanding that, absent the treaties at issue, authority over
“purely local” criminal laws would remain within the reserved powers of the
states under the Tenth Amendment. But if Holland is no longer good law, then
the Supreme Court has held in Medellín that the United States, as a nation, is
incapable of complying with its international legal obligations under Avena—
or any similar obligation in the future: the President cannot bring the nation
into compliance by unilateral declaration.280 The federal courts cannot require
compliance because of the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties, as interpreted
in Medellín.281 And now, after Bond, Congress too, despite what the Court said
in Medellín, cannot enforce the nation’s international obligations under either
Article I, Section 8, or Article I in combination with the Article II treaty power.
Holland’s doctrine—that “there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the
national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty
followed by such an act could”282 —was the sole route to compliance with the
ICJ’s judgment. Bond has blocked that route.

276. Id. at 2090.
277. Id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 2088 (opinion of Roberts,
C.J.) (enumerating similar federalism presumptions).
278. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 520.
279. Id. at 526.
280. Id. at 529-30.
281. Id. at 504.
282. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
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E. U.S. Treaty Practice After Bond
Avena aptly illustrates the predicament the United States faces today
because of the complexity and nature of modern treaty law.283 Today, as in
1789 and before, the states cannot always be relied upon to carry out the
international obligations of the United States. The resistance of the states to
treaty obligations they found distasteful—a paramount motivation for the
Philadelphia Convention culminating in the Constitution—did not cease in
1789. And although the United States is obviously not at risk of war with
Mexico, the states in Avena placed the nation in an awkward, diplomatically
harmful situation. To paraphrase Hamilton’s remark in The Federalist, after
Bond and contrary to the clear intent of the Framers, “the peace of the
WHOLE” may now indeed “be left at the disposal of a PART.”284
In Bond, the Court reasoned that Pennsylvania criminal law would suffice
to carry out the nation’s CWC international obligation to punish violations
under the treaty. Perhaps. But that is merely adventitious. Another state might
not have enacted a law that suffices to carry out CWC prosecution
obligations—or those contained in other treaties that require conduct in legal
domains traditionally deemed “purely local.” Why should the ability of the
United States to comply with a legitimate treaty obligation depend on the
fortuity of whether a state happens to have passed a law sufficient for that
purpose?
Avena also reinforces the contemporary need to understand the Tenth
Amendment within the context of a functional Constitution—one that respects
federalism and preserves its value in our constitutional order but does not set it
up as a constraint on the nation’s ability to act internationally or adhere to
international obligations. Justice Holmes’s words in Holland still ring true
today: “We must consider what this country has become in deciding what that
Amendment has reserved.”285 By abandoning Holland, as the wreckage of
Medellín suggests, the Supreme Court took a potentially dangerous step
backwards toward recreating one of the foremost problems that beset the new
nation under the Articles of Confederation. The Framers sought to resolve that
problem by making treaties the supreme law of the land and vesting the treaty
power exclusively in the federal government, thus giving it the power to
enforce international obligations against recalcitrant states. Bond makes that not
only more difficult but, at times, unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
“[I]t is not lightly to be assumed,” Holmes wrote, “that, in matters
requiring national action, ‘a power which must belong to and somewhere reside
in every civilized government’ is not to be found.”286 To have found a Tenth
283. Avena, recall, involved an international obligation that arose from (1) the U.N. Charter,
triggered by (2) Avena, which had been litigated under (3) the Optional Protocol based on violations of
(4) the VCCR, and then decided under (5) the Statute of the ICJ—also a treaty.
284. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cook ed., 1961).
285. 252 U.S. at 432-34.
286. Id. at 433 (1920) (quoting Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 33 (1903)).
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Amendment impediment to a treaty regulating migratory waterfowl would have
denied the federal government the authority to make that agreement. It would
have required would-be treaty partners to negotiate with the forty-eight states
of the Union instead—forty-eight different negotiations, state by state. That
cannot be the system established by the Framers under the Constitution.
True, the federal government retains domestic discretion to refuse to
implement a treaty. But the option of dishonoring U.S. obligations
internationally ought not be cavalierly embraced. Vindicating the high purposes
of the Constitution, so eloquently set forth in its Preamble, depends upon
preserving the nation’s credibility. It does not do to waive off this enduring
imperative, as the Bond Court did, with a thin, formal reference to Congress’s
discretion to disregard U.S. international obligations—all the while purporting
to apply a mere (but, after Bond, mandatory) canon of construction to laws
implementing treaties. 287 Preserving national credibility requires honoring
rather than betraying treaty commitments. This, in the final analysis, is
Holland’s raison d’être, to which Bond is oblivious.
Treaty law in the United States, like so much else in U.S. foreign
relations law, has always been shaped by history, tradition, principle, and
practice—by experience, as Holmes wrote elsewhere, rather than logic alone.288
Nothing in the experience of the United States revealed a need to abandon
Holland. And if experience establishes the need, at times, to make treaties that
arguably intrude on traditional conceptions of the boundaries of federalism in
domestic circumstances, it is difficult to see why the constitutional law of
treaties is not properly read to accommodate the needs of the nation that the
Constitution established for ages to come. Bond debilitated Holland. The
Court—and, we fear, the nation—will come to regret it.
Yet Holland can likely be salvaged without retreating explicitly from
Bond. Precisely because the Court did not expressly overrule Holland, it need
not reverse itself again in a future decision in order to revive Holland. As we
have suggested, the Court could have, as indeed it should have, treated
background principles and statutory canons of federalism as incorporating the
Court’s own interpretation of those principles in Holland. The Court could
simply make clear that, consistent with what it held in Holland, the federalism
principles that Congress should be presumed to bear in mind when it legislates
include Justice Holmes’s analysis of the interaction between the Article II
treaty power and the Tenth Amendment.
Like other structural principles of the Constitution, such as the separation
of powers, federalism cannot be reduced to brightline rules or formulae. The
Court should, as it has in the past, consider the values that the principles of
federalism serve in the U.S. constitutional system. In the spirit of McCulloch,
those principles must be adapted to the exigencies, needs, and global context of
the nation the Constitution established “to endure for ages to come.”289 The
spirit of McCulloch is also the spirit of Holland.

287. Bond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2077, 2089, slip op. at 13 (2014).
288. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
289. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
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